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Speech and Spatial Tactics 
Timothy Zick * 
As the Supreme Court has observed on many occasions, "First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive."1 This is so in the 
quite literal sense that the exercise of expressive rights requires adequate 
physical space. Given its primacy, it is remarkable how little attention has 
been given to the concept of "place" in First Amendment doctrine and 
theory. Place has always occupied the background rather than the 
foreground in free speech jurisprudence. It has been treated as a locale for 
events, a marker for expressive rules and procedures, an inert container of 
speakers and speech, a thing, a res. Free speech jurisprudence treats place 
categorically, defining expressive rights in terms of the character of the 
property or forum involved. It is far more concerned with questions of 
"what" speech is being regulated and "why" than with questions of "where" 
speech occurs or how speech and spatiality are connected. 
It is a serious mistake to view place as merely an inert container or a 
backdrop for expressive scenes. Place can be a powerful weapon of social 
and political control. Today speech, including core political speech, is being 
disciplined, controlled, and even suppressed through a variety of spatial 
techniques. Consider the following recent examples: 
the free speech cage, an architecture of mesh fabric, coiled razor wire, 
chain-link fences, and jersey barriers, constructed to contain 
protesters at the 2004 Democratic National Convention;2 
the "steel cocoon" that emerged within the District of Columbia prior to 
the 2005 presidential inauguration, 3 and the confinement of 
* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. I would like to thank Chris 
Borgen, Elaine Chiu, Paul Kirgis, Miehael Perino, Brian Tamanaha, Nelson Tebbe, Robert Tsai, 
Robert Vischer, and David Zaring for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
I. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963) (emphasis added). 
2. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66--
67 (D. Mass. 2004), affd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); 
Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Deplores but OK's Site for Protesters, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 2004, at 
AI. 
3. See David Johnston & Michael Janofsky, A Steel Cocoon Is Woven for the Capital's Big 
Party, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at Al6 (stating that, in the period leading up to President Bush's 
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protesters to spaces behind bleachers and fenced-in areas more than 
100 feet from the inauguration parade route;4 
the 25 block "restricted zone" that prohibited all protests near the 1999 
World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle;5 
the 1/2 block "frozen zone" or "bubble" used to shield New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg from union members protesting at the 
2004 Republican National Convention;6 
the use of metal barricades, or "pens," to confine and control those 
protesting the Iraq War; 7 
statutory and injunctive "free speech" and "speech-free" zones erected 
around abortion clinics and various other public accommodations;8 
campus "free speech zones" that confine First Amendment activity to 
narrowly circumscribed places;9 and 
recent laws in several states establishing protest zones for antiwar speech 
near funerals. 10 
inauguration, Washington D.C. "seemed to disappear behind curtains of steel security fences and 
concrete barriers"). 
4. !d.; Firsi Lady Defends Inaugural Celebration, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, 
available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/0 II 15/W orldandnation!First_lady _defends _in.shtml 
("The park service also has issued A.N.S.W.E.R. permits for protesters to stand in nine other 
smaller locations along Pennsylvania Ave. But the group says most of those areas are tiny pockets 
behind bleachers or in fenced-in areas more than 100 feet from the parade route."). 
5. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing Seattle's 
creation of the restricted zone and noting testimony that its purpose was "to exclude protestors"); id. 
at 1167 (Paez, J., concurring and dissenting) (observing that the restricted zone covered "25 square 
blocks of downtown Seattle"); see also Countdown to Chaos in Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 
1999, at Bl (relating that, on the third day of"WTO week," Seattle police announced that protests 
were prohibited within a "new restricted zone"). 
6. See Julia Preston, Court Backs Police Department in Curbs on Labor Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2004, at B7 (reporting unions' unsuccessful challenges to "barricades, metal pens, and 
'frozen zones"' that would restrain protesters who wanted to follow Bloomberg during the 2004 
Republican National Convention). 
7. See, e.g., Corey Dade, Election 2004: Democratic Show Set to Go; Protestors March, but 
Labor Feuds Settled, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 26, 2004, at AI (reporting that protesters attending 
the Democratic National Convention, who "were demonstrating against Democratic acquiescence in 
the Iraq war," objected to "the 'pen' police ha[dl erected to contain demonstrations"). 
8. See, e.g., New York ex rei. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat' I, 273 F.3d I84, 203-10 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that a preliminary injunction creating more extensive "buffer zones" at two abortion 
clinics in the Western District of New York violated protestors' free speech rights); Ex parte Tucci, 
859 S.W.2d I, 6-7 (Tex. 1993) (holding that a temporary restraining order's provision for a IOO-
foot speech-free zone surrounding a Planned Parenthood facility violates article I, section 8 of the 
Texas Constitution). 
9. See Thomas J. Davis, Note, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University Free Speech 
Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND. L.J. 267, 267-68 (2004) (describing occasions at 
various university campuses when students were arrested for protesting outside of designated free 
speech zones). 
10. Associated Press, Legislators Propose Bills Barring Protests at Funerals, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CENTER, Nov. I4, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=l6064 
(describing recent legislation in Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Indiana, and Tennessee). 
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Under current First Amendment doctrine, restrictions on the place 
where expression may occur are routinely upheld. 11 The First Amendment 
nominally requires that these sorts of restrictions, like content-neutral 
restrictions on the time and manner of expression, satisfy an "intermediate" 
level of scrutiny. 12 But in truth this standard is little more than a weak strain 
of rationality review. 13 Courts generally tend to view spatial restrictions as 
unrelated to expressive content. They are treated as inarguably rational 
means of serving governmental interests such as maintaining order and 
security. 14 And, indeed, some such regulations are necessary to preserve a 
minimal degree of order. Parade routes, for instance, must sometimes be 
altered to account for such realities as traffic and pedestrian flow. The First 
Amendment is not a license to speak wherever one pleases. But this basic 
principle does not afford the state plenary authority to suppress speech on 
matters of political and social import by significantly displacing or confining 
it. Purportedly neutral restrictions on place can and do cancel expressive and 
associative rights. One need look no further than the aforementioned Boston 
speech cage for affirmation of this. 15 
This Article does not dispute that the state must sometimes control the 
place of expression. Space, after all, is a limited resource. My right to speak 
in a certain place often will impact others' enjoyment of that place. The 
constitutional doctrine of place initially sought to deal with just this sort of 
rudimentary conflict. 16 It held that the state could deny a speaker the ability 
II. See NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1211 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that, in 
order to protect the "concept of a public forum where some or all citizens have a right to speak, the 
Court has permitted government to place certain restrictions on this right"); Katharine McCarthy, 
Note, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of Free Speech Rights in the Doctor-Patient 
Relationship, 56 ME. L. REv. 447, 460 (2004) ("In fact, limitations on the manner, time and place of 
expression are generally upheld if the restrictions serve a significant government interest and if the 
restrictions themselves do not alter the message, ideas, or content of expression."). 
12. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976) (noting that time, place, and manner restrictions are valid if, in addition to being 
')ustified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, ... they serve a significant 
governmental interest, and ... they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information"); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y ofN.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
175-76 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (observing that intermediate scrutiny "applies to 
content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions on speech in public forums"). 
13. Traditionally, the rational basis test requires only that state action "be permissible, 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and not impose an irrational burden on 
individuals." Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, N.Y., 316 F.3d 314, 322 (2d Cir. 2003). 
14. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (holding that the governmental interest in 
protecting the public from harassment justified a "bubble zone" around a health care facility). 
15. See Saltzman, supra note 2, at AI (relating that, leading up to the 2004 Democratic 
National Convention in Boston, "several activists insisted that they [were] so disgusted with the 
designated protest zone that they ha[ d] no intention of using it"). 
16. See REDLICH ET AL., supra note II, at 1211 ("[l]f a number of speakers want to use the 
same public forum at the same time, they will drown each other out and no speaker could convey 
her particular message. Thus, ... the Court has permitted government to place certain restrictions 
on this right [to speak]."). 
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to express herself in the middle of a busy intersection. 17 But the sorts of 
cages, zones, and pens that have appeared of late involve an altogether 
different strain of spatial restriction. Here the state has moved from 
regulating place to actually, in some cases, creating places for the express 
purpose of controlling and disciplining protest and dissent. This sort of 
spatial sophistication is a recent phenomenon. It represents a new generation 
of spatial regulations. Governments have learned to manipulate geography in 
a manner that now seriously threatens basic First Amendment principles. 
This is a substantial extension of the principle that the state may regulate the 
time, place, and manner of expressive activity. It is an extension that 
deserves far more scholarly and judicial attention than it has received. 
The law can be a blunt instrument for assessing a concept as complex as 
place. To assist in highlighting the significance of place to expressive and 
associative rights and to put the recent spatial trend in context, this Article 
borrows from the work of scholars who have for many years been actively 
engaged in the systematic study of place. In disciplines such as 
anthropology, sociology, and philosophy, the techniques of concern in this 
Article are sometimes referred to as "spatial tactics."18 Spatial tactics 
represent the ''use of space as a strategy and/ or technique of power and social 
control."19 When scholars in these various fields study spatial tactics, they 
examine the architectures of places such as prisons, planned towns, gated 
communities, and tourist villages. 20 The design of these places is purposeful; 
it is specifically intended to control environments, activities, even entire 
populations. 
Similarly, spatial tactics are giving rise to places that are intended to 
control expression. This Article will refer to cages, zones, and pens as 
"tactical places." Tactical places impact expressive and associative rights in 
a variety of ways. By design, these places mute and even suppress messages, 
depress participation in social and political protests, and send negative 
signals to those on the outside regarding those confined within. Social and 
political movements often require disruption and a degree of confrontation 
17. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ("One would not be justified in 
ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he ... sought by that means to direct public attention 
to an announcement of his opinions."). 
18. See Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga, Locating Culture, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE I, 30--32 (Setha M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zilli.iga 
eds., 2003) (discussing spatial tactics). 
19. /d. at 30 (noting "the way space is used to obscure" power relations and distributions). 
20. See, e.g., Miehael Herzfeld, After Authenticity at an American Heritage Site, in THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 370 (examining a 
tourist village); Setha M. Low, The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of 
Urban Fear, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, 
at 387 (discussing gated communities); Paul Rabinow, Ordonnance, Discipline, Regulation: Some 
Reflections on Urbanism, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, 
supra note 18, at 353 (exploring disciplinary space). 
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with authority in order to be even marginally effective.21 Protests in tactical 
places are docile; they are tightly scripted and ineffectual imitations of past 
social and political movements. In one sense, the very purpose of agitation 
and protest is to contest the status quo, to disrupt it. Passively filing into 
cages, zones, and other tactical places is an utter capitulation to that status 
quo. The spatial tactics examined in this Article, the ones that produce 
tactical places, represent a movement toward a perfect geometry of control 
over just the sort of speech the First Amendment ought to protect-that 
which challenges authority, offends sensibilities, or otherwise "disturb[s] the 
complacent."22 Geometric precision is being utilized to marginalize dissent, 
to capture and confine it. Freedom (of speech) is being measured in feet, 
partitioned based upon Euclidean principles. 
Two societal phenomena seem to have moved us in this direction. The 
events of September 11, 200 1, have created a climate in which dissent and 
divisive expression, and speakers associated with this sort of activity, are 
viewed as dangerous. 23 The government has moved aggressively to 
segregate what it sees as potentially threatening dissension and agitation.24 
In addition, the "culture wars" have heightened sensitivity to certain strains 
of particularly disturbing and upsetting speech, such as pro-life protests and 
"hate speech."25 Governments have begun to rely on place as a means of 
21. See generally Dieter Rucht, The Changing Role of Political Protest Movements, W. EUR. 
POL., Oct. 2003, at 153, 171 ("Following the student revolts of the 1960s, left-libertarians have 
helped to create a more active, more liberal, more democratic and more participatory political 
culture in Germany .... [W]ithout the tenacious left-libertarian mobilisation it has experienced, 
Germany would most likely retain much more of the authoritarian heritage that characterised the 
Adenauer era."); Michael Specter, The Extremist: The Woman Behind the Most SuccessfUl Radical 
Group in America, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 2003, at 52 (illustrating, through the example of People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, how social movements use radicalism that alienates the 
mainstream in order to achieve moderate progress). 
22. Martinv.CityofStruthers,319U.S.I41, 143(1943). 
23. See, e.g., Kris Axtman, Political Dissent Can Bring Federal Agents to Door, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2002, at I (noting that federal authorities have been questioning Americans 
who criticize the government, the President, or the war on terrorism); see also AM. CML LIBERTIES 
UNION, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST-9/11 AMERICA (May 2003), 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/dissent_report.pdf (describing restrietions on mass protests and 
rallies, symbolic expression, and other expressions of dissent in the period following September II, 
2001). 
24. This phenomenon is not limited to governments. Private employers and other private 
actors, unconstrained by First Amendment concerns, have suppressed expression in the spaces 
under their control as well. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private 
Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 10 I, I 03-{)4 (2004) (noting the trend of nongovernmental suppression of speech and arguing 
that the First Amendment should reach some such private acts). 
25. See Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHL-KENT L. 
REV. 531, 532-33 (2003) ("In the ongoing culture wars, few battlegrounds are more contested than 
freedom of expression. In recent decades, the First Amendment has been at the heart of 
controversies over antiwar demonstrations, pornography, hate speech, flag burning, abortion 
counseling, anti-abortion protests, and the National Endowment for the Arts."); cf Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of choosing sides in a 
586 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:581 
controlling this sort of speech. There are tactical reasons for such reliance on 
place as a speech-control mechanism. As mentioned, the "intermediate" 
scrutiny applied to place regulations is quite forgiving and flexible. It has 
become even more so in light of heightened security concerns. More 
generally, place is perceived as a "neutral" mass capable of effecting a fair 
and value-free segmentation of speakers. 
Courts and scholars are responsible for this presumption of spatial 
neutrality. Place in general, and the use of spatial tactics in particular, have 
not received concentrated attention from First Amendment scholars. There 
are, of course, many critiques of the Supreme Court's "public forum" 
doctrine, which categorizes places as either open or closed to expression-
"public" or "nonpublic" forums in the Court's parlance?6 These critiques are 
well deserved, not least because public forum doctrine makes it possible for 
the state to manipulate place. But there is a larger failure in the doctrine of 
place. Place as a concept has not been considered worthy of independent 
scholarly analysis. Nor has it been deemed worthy of serious judicial 
thought. As others have noted, the Court has never provided much in the 
way of any theoretical justification for its public forum doctrine,27 and it 
continues to treat place restrictions as if they raise no serious First 
Amendment issues. Indeed, place is currently so undervalued that scholars, 
along with the rest of the public, seemed barely to notice when courts 
sanctioned the construction of the speech cage at the Democratic National 
Convention in Boston?8 Even this tactical place, an architecture the district 
court described as an "internment camp" and an "affront to the role of free 
expression,"29 was permitted to stand under the doctrine of place.30 
"culture war" by striking down a state law that prohibited ordinances designed to protect 
homosexuals). 
26. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REv. I, 26-27 (arguing that rather than simply banning speech in a forum, courts should reach a 
mutually satisfactory arrangement that accommodates both free speech interests and the interests in 
the forum's other uses, such as a street's travel use); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral 
Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 309-11 (1999) (asserting that the 
Supreme Court has never adequately addressed the "public forum problem" and suggesting that the 
ideal solution rests in adopting a free speech doctrine analogous to common law nuisance 
principles); Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 
741-42 (1991) (discussing widespread criticism of the public forum doctrine for tending to rely on 
easy labels rather than substantive analysis of First Amendment issues). 
27. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the 
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1760--64 (1987) (arguing that the Court relies on tradition 
for its public forum doctrine and that even this is "unfounded and incomplete"). 
28. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 
74-76 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 
2004) (discussing the constitutionality of the "demonstration zone" at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention). 
29. /d. at 74-75. 
30. See id. at 76 ("[G]iven the constraints present at the location and the [Boston Police 
Departmentl's reasonable safety concerns, there is no injunctive relief that I could fashion that 
would vindicate plaintiffs' First Amendment rights without causing quite siguificant harm to the 
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The spatial tactics phenomenon strongly hints that something is 
seriously amiss in the doctrinal and theoretical treatment of place. Perhaps in 
an era of rapid technological advances, many view concern over protesters' 
access to streets, sidewalks, and other public venues as quaint or 
unnecessary. Perhaps the presumed neutrality of place accounts for this 
general complacency. Or perhaps, in the collective mind, security of place 
now simply outweighs liberty of place. Whatever the reason for the societal 
(and this, as will become clear, most certainly includes judicial) 
complacence, this kind of manipulation of place should give us pause. We 
are rightly proud of our country's expressive tradition, including its tolerance 
of public displays of dissent. But while here, in the United States, spatial 
tactics are neutering political dissent, protesters in countries deemed far less 
friendly to dissent are discovering the power that comes with the ability to 
access, even commandeer, public spaces.31 
This Article advocates a spatial tum in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The tum has two basic components. First, this Article seeks to 
reconceptualize place, to get us thinking about the idea of place in a 
fundamentally different way. Current judicial thinking's permissive stance 
toward place can be traced to the concept that place is nothing more than 
property, or res. This Article aims to correct that misconception of place, to 
demonstrate that speech and spatiality are critically related and intersect in a 
variety of ways that a conception of place-as-res cannot appreciate. The rise 
of tactical places demonstrates that res is an insufficient concept for place. 
Second, the spatial tum entails a reexamination of the standards currently 
applied in reviewing spatial tactics and modem tactical places. In general, 
the proposal is to sharpen the so-called intermediate standard that applies to 
spatial restrictions such that a knowledgeably skeptical form of scrutiny is 
applied when the state uses spatial tactics. The spatial tum's two elements 
are thus related. Doctrinal changes-including sharpening the so-called 
intermediate standard-will materialize only if and when courts more fully 
understand the dynamic relationship between speech and spatiality, 
dispensing with current conceptions of place as merely res. 
Part I describes four recent examples of spatial tactics in expressive 
contexts: the utilization of pens, cages, and other architectural tactics to 
(dis)place political dissent; statutory and injunctive "buffer zones" used to 
City, the delegates, and the public interest .... "); see also Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 
F.3d 8, 12-14 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that it was "a close and difficult case" but finding reasonable 
the district court's conclusion that the demonstration zone satisfied the "intermediate scrutiny" of 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in public fora), aff'g Coal. to Protest the Democratic 
Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004). 
31. See Supara Janchitfah, Landless Find Strength in Numbers: A Network of Landless Farmers 
Is Challenging the Government's Inaction on Long-Promised Land Reform, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 
15, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 9936756 (reporting on increased protests by poor rural farmers 
in southern Thailand who are seeking to convince the Thai government to distribute public land 
with expired leases to the poor). 
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control expression at abortion clinics; campus "free speech zones"; and the 
use of "free speech" and "speech-free" zones at various other public 
accommodations. When viewed in isolation, some of these examples may 
not seem seriously troubling. But when properly considered collectively, as 
part of a trend, it is apparent that these geometries are fundamentally altering 
the manner in which protest and dissent are conveyed in public places. 
Spatial tactics are carefully arranging the separation of speakers and listeners. 
They are facilitating listener avoidance of speech that offends and irritates. 
To explain why spatial tactics are currently viewed with little skepticism 
or alarm, Part II situates place in First Amendment jurisprudence. Spatial 
tactics are currently viewed as neutral because that is generally how courts 
and commentators view place itself-as an inert, neutral element of the 
expressive background. Through the nonsystematic inventions of the public 
forum and "time, place, and manner" doctrines, place ultimately became 
mere res. The primary assumptions underlying the place-as-res concept are 
that speech and spatiality are entirely separate and distinct, that place is 
merely a background or context for expression, and that place is 
presumptively partitioned without regard to the content of expression. 
These assumptions are all false. Their persistence is not merely a 
function of the infirmities, well articulated by others, of the Court's public 
forum doctrine. The cause runs deeper than this, to the absence of any real 
conceptual understanding of place at all. To understand why spatial tactics 
and their associated tactical places are constitutionally troubling, place must 
be reconceptualized. Drawing on the work of scholars of place from a 
variety of other disciplines, including geography, sociology, anthropology, 
and philosophy, Part III offers a different theoretical perspective on place. It 
proposes an interdisciplinary concept, "expressive place," that views place as 
variable rather than merely binary; primary rather than secondary to 
expression; constructed or created rather than objectively given; and dynamic 
rather than inert. Place, in other words, is not merely an inert res. It is an 
expression of power, message, and meaning. Speakers and listeners do not 
merely occupy places; they connect with and speak through them. 
Finally, Part IV returns to spatial tactics and tactical places, examining 
them in light of place's conceptual repositioning. Viewing spatial tactics 
through the conceptual lens of expressive place, Part IV contends that spatial 
tactics deserve a far more faithful application of the intermediate standard of 
review articulated by the Court. There are several doctrinal implications 
here. First, at the outset, courts should actively question the premise that 
tactical places are neutral with regard to subject matter and viewpoint. This 
Article suggests that for many reasons it is more faithful to First Amendment 
principles to treat such places as at least "content-correlated," a phrase some 
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on the Court have applied to zoning restrictions for adult entertainment. 32 
Although this does not lead to strict judicial scrutiny, it can and should lead 
to much sharper judicial scrutiny of spatial tactics than current practice 
entails. This means, in tum, that the state should bear the burden of 
justifying the use of spatial tactics by providing specific evidence of 
supposed threats to community, order, or safety. The state should be 
required, when it constructs tactical places, to tailor lines that facilitate 
speaker access to potential listeners and that restrict only as much expression 
as is truly necessary to serve the state's demonstrated purposes. Finally, 
courts should view with far greater skepticism than they currently do the 
argument that spatial tactics leave open ample and adequate alternative space 
for expressive activity. They should, in short, take far more seriously the 
notion that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in 
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised elsewhere."33 
I. Spatial Tactics 
This Part describes the modem-day spatial tactics and tactical places 
with which this Article is concerned. Not all spatial restrictions are or should 
be constitutionally suspect. A restriction on where signs or banners may be 
placed, for example, does not ordinarily raise substantial constitutional 
questions. Under prevailing standards, so long as such restrictions are 
minimally tailored and leave open ample alternative outlets for the speaker to 
communicate his or her message, the state may regulate place to serve 
aesthetic or other important public interests.34 When, however, the state uses 
geometric and other spatial techniques to physically construct cages, zones, 
pens, and other architectures to control and discipline expression, basic First 
Amendment principles are threatened in a more direct and serious manner. 
The spatial tactics of the sort described below should be viewed with greater 
skepticism than run mine place restrictions that minimally burden expression. 
A. The (Dis)placing of Political Protest 
The most noticeable and disturbing recent trend has been the 
segmentation of place to control and displace mass protests, demonstrations, 
and other political and social agitation.35 Political dissent has become spatial 
32. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457--60 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (discussing content-correlated zoning restrictions as lower scrutiny alternatives to 
content-based regulations). 
33. Schneiderv. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
34. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that location 
restrictions on protests "are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information"). 
35. As the district court in the case involving the free speech cage at the 2004 Democratic 
National Convention noted, the use of demonstration zones "is a relatively recent innovation," one 
that "apparently [became] routine at large political events ever since the 1999 World Trade 
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tactics' principal casualty.36 Indeed, the act of mounting a political protest 
has been fundamentally altered by spatial tactics. 
Within existing First Amendment doctrine, the government has a variety 
of spatial tactics at its disposal to control mass movements and expressions 
of public dissent. It can, so long as there are clear and objective standards, 
require speakers and demonstrators to obtain permits prior to events.37 It can 
alter parade and demonstration routes to ensure that order is maintained.38 
These are, at least in a broad sense, spatial tactics. But again, the state is 
generally permitted to use these sorts of restrictions, so long as there is no 
proof that the government is manipulating parade routes to suppress a 
particular message39 or exercising "unfettered discretion" in licensing access 
to places.40 
But governments have begun to implement more specific control 
mechanisms with regard to protests and other mass events. A more local and 
more precise geometry of place has begun to fashion an expressive 
topography that limits, confines, and controls protest and dissent. Just as 
military commanders partition and segment their battlefields, governments 
have begun to partition and segment expressive venues.41 The state, through 
Organization meeting in Seattle." Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'/ Convention, 327 F. Supp. 
2d at 73. For a discussion of some of the recent tactics officials have used to control protests, see 
Mary M. Cheh, Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment Protection of Special 
Places, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 53, 53-61 (2004). 
36. Ken Paulson, Marches at a Standstill: The New Limits on Assembly, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CENTER, Feb. 23, 2003, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=6340 
("America's cities appear increasingly reluctant to allow protest marches, citing security and cost 
concerns."). 
37. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,570-76 (1941) (affirming the constitutionality of 
a state statute "prohibiting a 'parade or procession' upon a public street without a special license"). 
38. See id. at 574 ("The authority of a municipality to impose regulations ... in the use of 
public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the 
means of safe-guarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on 
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need."); cf United 
for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that 
New York City's denial of the plaintiff's application for a permit to march past the United Nations 
building did not violate the First Amendment because of the "siguificant governmental interest" in 
"the peace and security of the United Nations Headquarters and the U.S. Mission" and because the 
City had "offered as an alternative a stationary rally"), ajJ'd, 323 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2003). 
39. Cf United for Peace & Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (noting the absence of evidence that 
New York City's restriction on the plaintiff's ability to march past the United Nations building was 
"being applied or justified in any way because of the anti-war message of the marchers"). 
40. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (affirming the constitutionality of a statute that required a license 
for parades, noting the state court's determination that "the licensing board was not vested with 
arbitrary power or an unfettered discretion"); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 
(1939) (agreeing with the invalidation of an ordinance that authorized an official to deny permits 
based only on the official's "mere opinion" because the ordinance could "be made the instrument of 
arbitrary suppression of free expression ... "). 
41. Although this phenomenon has become more and more common, the practice is not entirely 
new. See, e.g., Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(upholding the use of a "bull pen," in which only twelve persons would be permitted to 
demonstrate, outside the Russian Mission in New York City). 
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spatial tactics, is actively creating distinct, tactical places for expressive 
activity. Spatial tactics are giving rise to what we might consider particular 
architectures of place. As we shall see, the battlefield analogy is particularly 
apt, for these architectures are generally being constructed in the name of 
post-September 11 security. 
The tactical displacement of demonstrators and demonstrations is a 
phenomenon largely of the past decade or so and has become particularly 
prevalent in the past few years. "Zoning" of some sort or another has been 
applied to individual public officials, presidential inaugurations, and major 
conventions alike. For example, President Bush has been shielded from 
numerous organized protests during his campaigns and presidency.42 The 
Secret Service visited locations ahead of time and established "free speech 
zones" or "protest zones" where those opposed to the President's policies 
were effectively quarantined.43 Supporters of the President, on the other 
hand, were generally permitted much closer access to the candidate.44 The 
zones were effective at keeping protesters at a substantial distance from the 
President.45 They also separated protesters from the media covering the 
campaign.46 At least on some occasions, media personnel were not permitted 
inside the protest zones, and protesters were confined to them once inside.47 
Despite their names, the "protest zones" and "free speech zones" 
established during President Bush's 2004 campaign were hardly speech-
facilitative. They were not designed to be such. In Pittsburgh, for example, 
local police established a "designated free speech zone" on a baseball field 
42. See James Bovard, "Free-Speech Zone": The Administration Quarantines 
Dissent, AM. CONSERVATIVE, Dec. 15, 2003, available at 
http://www.amconmag.com/2003/12 _15 _ 03/feature.html (describing how the Secret Service 
"routinely succeed[s] in keeping protesters out of presidential sight"); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, supra note 23, at 11-13 (describing use of protest zones at campaign events); Jonathan M. 
Katz, Thou Dost Protest Too Much, SLATE, Sept. 24, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2107012/ 
(describing protester's conviction for refusing to demonstrate in the designated "free speech zone"). 
43. Bovard, supra note 42. Federal law prohibits entry into any designated "posted, cordoned 
off, or otherwise restricted area" where the President "is or will be temporarily visiting[.]" 18 
U.S.C. 1752(a)(l)(ii). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1752(d)(2) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the 
Treasury "to prescribe regulations governing ingress or egress to such buildings and grounds and to 
posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted areas where the President or other person protected by 
the Secret Service is or will be temporarily visiting"); United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 309 
(4th Cir. 2005) (upholding the conviction of a campaign event protester based on his1presence in a 
restricted presidential area). 
44. This precise control of space and place was a hallmark of the Bush campaign. For example, 
at certain campaign events only those who were willing to sign a pledge of support for the President 
were permitted inside the campaign venue. G. Jeffrey MacDonald, A Close Eye-And Tight Grip-
On Campaign Protestors, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 2004, at II, available at 
http://www .csmonitor.com/2004/0927 /p II s02-ussc.html. 
45. Bovard, supra note 42. 
46. /d. (stating that the protest zones set up by the Secret Service ahead of President Bush's 
visits often kept protesters "outside the view of media covering the event"). 
47. See id. (relating one protester's description of a protest zone's conditions during a 2003 visit 
by President Bush). 
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surrounded by a chain-link fence.48 The site was a third of a mile from the 
President's scheduled speech location.49 These zones were not suggested 
venues for expression and protest; they were intended to be and were utilized 
as somewhat coercive architectures of control. 5° Several protesters were in 
fact arrested for refusing to utilize these specially designated spaces. 5 1 
Speech at large campaign events, specifically national political 
conventions, has been hampered by tactical zones of greater scale. During 
the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, -for example, 
government officials designated a "secured zone" around the stadium where 
the convention was to take place. 52 The zone covered-that is it cordoned 
off-approximately 185 acres of land surrounding the convention site,53 and 
it was in effect 24 hours a day.54 Ostensibly to accommoda,te expressive 
interests, officials designated an "Official Demonstration" area for protesters 
within this secured zone. 55 The zone effectively kept the protesters 260 yards 
from any participating delegate.56 A district court enjoined the use of this 
zone, not because it was intended to suppress expression, but rather because 
its dimensions were so disproportionate to the state's interests as to be 
deemed insufficiently tailored even under the relatively lenient tailoring 
requirement applied to spatial regulations. 57 
One of the unique and, in terms of expressive freedoms, disturbing 
aspects of geometric techniques like zoning is that the geometry or physics 
can be refined, in effect making it a more perfect means of control. The 
"experts," which in the context of political conventions are generally law 
enforcement officials, essentially learn from prior mistakes. They devise 
new and more restrictive architectures. 
Thus, at the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, the 
government once again resorted to zoning to contain anticipated 
48. Dave Lindorff, Keeping Dissent Invisible: How the Secret Service and the White House 
Keep Protestors Safely out of Bush's Sight-And off TV, SALON, Oct. 16, 2003, 
http:/ /www.salon.com/news/featurc/2003/ I 0/ 16/secret_ service/index.html. 
49. Bovard, supra note 42. 
50. See Lindorff, supra note 48 (likening the design of a free speech area to that of a 
concentration camp). 
51. Id; see also Katz, supra note 42. 
52. Serv. Employee lnt'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968-69 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
53. Jd at 971. 
54. Jd 
55. Jd at 969. 
56. Jd at 972. 
57. Jd at 974-75. Other similarly situated security zones have been struck down as 
unconstitutional for the same reason. See, e.g., United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (invalidating a 175-foot "safety zone"); Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 
1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (invalidating a 75-yard "safety zone" between demonstrators and their 
intended audience). 
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demonstrators. 58 As in Los Angeles in 2000, there were two zones in Boston, 
a "hard security zone," which comprised the convention center and 
immediately adjacent areas, and a "soft security zone," which encompassed 
areas further removed from the convention site. 59 
The government constructed a "designated demonstration zone" (DZ) 
within the soft security zone.60 The DZ was a "roughly rectangular space of 
approximately 26,000 to 28,000 square feet-very approximately 300 feet by 
90 feet."61 The "overall impression created by the DZ," the court noted, was 
that of "an internment camp."62 The district court's description of the DZ 
merits emphasis: 
Most-at least two-thirds-of the DZ lies under unused Green Line 
tracks. The tracks create a space redolent of the sensibility conveyed 
in Piranesi's etchings published as Fanciful Images of Prisons. It is a 
grim, mean, and oppressive space whose ominous roof is supported by 
a forest of girders that obstruct sight lines throughout as the tracks 
slope downwards towards the southern end. 
The DZ is surrounded by two rows of concrete jersey barriers. Atop 
each of the jersey barriers is an eight foot high chain link fence. A 
tightly woven mesh fabric, designed to prevent liquids and objects 
from being thrown through the fenee, covers the outer fence, limiting 
but not eliminating visibility. From the top of the outer fence to the 
train tracks overhead, at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees 
to horizontal, is a looser mesh netting, designed to prevent objects 
from being thrown at the delegates. 
On the overhead Green Line tracks themselves is looped razor wire, 
designed to prevent persons from climbing onto the tracks where 
armed police and National Guardsman [sic] will be located.63 
Other "design elements" of this oppressive architecture limited the 
number of protesters to no more than 1,000 (despite the fact that the city had 
originally assured that at least 4,000 could be accommodated); severely 
restricted the use of signs, posters, and other visual material; and prohibited 
58. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 
61, 75 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F)d 8 (1st Cir. 
2004), for the district court's·discussion of the reasonableness, in consideration of past incidents like 
those at the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, of certain characteristics of the 
Boston "demonstration zone." For example, the court noted that the demonstration zone's double 
fence was "reasonable in light of past experience in which demonstrators have pushed over a single 
fence." /d. 
59. Id. at 65. 
60. /d. at 66. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 74. 
63. /d. at 67. The court prefaced its account by noting that "[a] written description cannot 
convey the ambience of the DZ site as experienced during the view." /d. 
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the passing of leaflets to delegates, even those who approached the DZ.64 
The space, the district court said, "convey[ed] the symbolic sense of a 
holding pen where potentially dangerous persons are separated from 
others."65 
Nevertheless, following traditional First Amendment doctrine the 
district court upheld the DZ cage as a content-neutral regulation of the place 
of expression.66 This "internment camp," which the district court referred to 
as a "symbolic affront to the role of free expression," was held to be entirely 
consistent with First Amendment standards relating to place.67 This was so, 
the court said, for two reasons. First, the court concluded that there was no 
specific evidence that the government had intentionally constructed the DZ 
in order to suppress expression. 68 Second, the court relied upon "past 
experience" at other demonstrations, by which the court meant incidents of 
violent protest, to conclude that a substantial safety threat was present at this 
event as well. 69 The district judge also opined that "given the constraints of 
time, geography, and safety, I cannot say that the design itself is not narrowly 
tailored in light of other opportunities for communication available under the 
larger security plan."70 This was so despite the fact that the DZ was "the 
only available location providing a direct interface between demonstrators 
and the area where delegates ... entered and left" the convention site.71 
The First Circuit affirmed.72 In what can only be characterized as 
judicial understatement, the court acknowledged that the DZ's enclosed 
space was "far from a perfect solution."73 Still, the court upheld the spatial 
tactic. It held that the DZ satisfied the First Amendment's intermediate 
scrutiny standard for content-neutral regulations of place. 74 The First Circuit 
reasoned that the DZ was "plainly content-neutral and there can be no 
doubting the substantial government interest in the maintenance of security at 
political conventions."75 The court conceded that there was no "event-
specific threat evidence," but declined to require it to validate the use of the 
64. !d. at 67-68. 
65. !d. at 74--75 (emphasis added). 
66. !d. at 75-76. 
67. !d. at 74--75. 
68. See id. at 75-76 (treating the DZ as a content-neutral regulation of place); see also Bl(a)ck 
Tea Soc'y v .. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that "the challenged security 
precautions af.e plainly content-neutral"), aff'g Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. 
City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004). 
69. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'/ Convention, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75 & 75 n.2 
(declining to rely upon an ex parte submission regarding actual threats and instead concluding that 
the DZ was "reasonable in light of past experience"). 
70. !d. at 75. 
71. !d. at 74. 
72. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 8. 
73. !d. at 11. 
74. !d. at 14. 
75. !d. at 12. 
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DZ.76 The First Circuit also acknowledged that the DZ "allowed no 
opportunity for physical interaction (such as the distribution of leaflets) and 
severely curtailed any chance for one-on-one conversation."77 Further, it 
recognized that visual communication, as with signs or posters, was 
significantly hampered by the DZ's architectural design. 78 Nevertheless, the 
court found that adequate alternative channels of communication existed. lt 
emphasized in particular that demonstrators could convey their messages at 
such "high profile" events as national political conventions through the mass 
media. 79 
Ultimately, not a single demonstrator utilized this "holding pen."80 Had 
they done so, protesters would have been crowded into the DZ's narrow 
confines, unable to utilize visual techniques much less engage in face-to-face 
interactions with the convention delegates. They would have been under 
constant police surveillance.81 There was even some concern, voiced by the 
district court, that protesters would not be safe in the cage. 82 The DZ, as it 
turned out, was a perfect geometry of control. Its architecture was so 
restrictive that dissent was entirely suppressed in the one place where it was 
most likely to have an impact. 
The DZ is only one example of the increasing perfection of geometric 
control brought about by spatial tactics. Today, all protest assemblies are 
subjected to some sort of spatial tactics. Seattle took the extraordinary step 
in 1999 of suspending all assembly within a 25 block area surrounding the 
World Trade Organization conference. 83 Colorado Springs recently 
established a "security zone" around a hotel at which several defense 
ministers were gathered.84 During George W. Bush's first and second 
76. /d. at 13-14. 
77. /d. at 13. 
78. Id. (noting that the use of signs was "hampered ... by the cramped space and the mesh 
screening"). 
79. /d. at 14 (citing opportunities to communicate via "television, radio, the press, the internet, 
and other outlets"). 
80. See, e.g., John Kifner, Demonstrators Steer Clear of Their Designated Space, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 2004, at P3 ("The designated demonstration area, a dank place under abandoned elevated 
tracks, failed its first test Sunday when what will probably be the largest demonstration of the 
convention period simply walked right by it."). 
81. See James Bovard, Editorial, Protests Pre-empted, BALT. SUN, Aug. 6, 2004, at 13A 
(stating that the ambience of the demonstration zone was "accentuated by the police helicopters 
patrolling overhead, by the omnipresent National Guardsmen in their camo outfits and by the state 
police occasionally prancing around in their black armor suits"). 
82. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 
67 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that the City would have to limit the capacity of the DZ because of 
safety questions the judge raised while inspecting the site), affd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City 
of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
83. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding the restricted 
zone as a valid time, place, and manner regulation). 
84. See Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, No. Civ.A.04CV00464-RPM, 
2005 WL 1769230 (D. Colo. July 25, 2005) (upholding a security zone that closed all public streets 
around the hotel). 
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inaugurations, protesters were issued permits to demonstrate only in 
designated areas or "free speech zones."85 At the most recent inauguration, 
antiwar protesters were given some space along the inauguration parade 
route, but they were otherwise limited to "tiny spaces" behind bleachers and 
to "fenced-in areas more than 100 feet from the parade route."86 There was 
thick irony in an inauguration devoted to the principles of liberty and 
freedom taking place within what journalists described as a "steel cocoon."87 
As noted, one of the lessons of the DZ is that zoning techniques can be 
made progressively finer and more precise. When it comes to political 
dissent, designated speech zones and the building of specific architectures do 
not exhaust the government's arsenal of spatial tactics. ln addition to zones 
and cages, the government has begun to use more localized architectures and 
tactics like pens, protective bubbles, and even nets to control and discipline 
dissent and dissenters. 88 
The use of metal barricades, or "pens," is a relatively recent law 
enforcement spatial tactic. As the name suggests, pens are closed, four-sided 
barricades used to contain protesters and essentially render them immobile.89 
The pens are difficult to climb over and impossible to crawl under.90 Still, 
some courts have characterized these structures as speech-facilitative. For 
example, one judge described pens as "a practical device used by the police 
to protect those actively exercising their rights from those who would prevent 
its exercise.'m At a February 2003 demonstration against the Iraq war, 
85. See, e.g., Jill Lawrence, Protesters Plan to Turn Their Backs on Bush, USA TODAY, Jan. 
17, 2005, at !lA (explaining that authorities expected a similar level of protest to the first 
inauguration in which "two of six protest permits went to groups supportive of Bush, the rest to 
opponents"); Johanna Neuman, Tamer Protests Expected for Second Inauguration, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
14, 2005, at A12 ("During the Bush campaign, protesters were often given permits to demonstrate 
only in spaces far from event sites."); Paulson, supra note 36 (noting that during President George 
W. Bush's first inauguration "protesters were issued permits to demonstrate only in designated areas 
along the parade route"). 
86. Associated Press, Protesters Get Prime Spot for Inauguration, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CENTER, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
news. aspx ?id= 146 8 I & Search S tring=inaugura tion. 
87. See Johnston & Janofsky, supra note 3, at Al6 (describing "curtains of steel security fences 
and concrete barriers" erected in Washington, D.C. in anticipation of the inauguration ceremony). 
88. See Preston, supra note 6, at B7 (referring to "barricades, metal pens, and 'frozen zones'" 
used to shield New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg from protesters during the Republican 
National Convention in 2004). 
89. See Julia Preston, Searches of Convention Protesters Limited, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at 
B4 (discussing the efforts of the New York Civil Liberties Union to force the police to abandon the 
use of closed, four-sided pens, "which are set up with metal barriers that are hard to climb over and 
impossible to crawl under[,]" to contain the protesters). 
90. !d. 
91. Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing "a barricaded enclosure for 
demonstrators and counterdemonstrators"). But see Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 
9162(RWS), 03 Civ. 9163(RWS), 03 Civ. 9164(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. July 
16, 2004) (finding, based on the record, that a law enforcement policy of using pens was not 
narrowly tailored). 
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police used pens to create block-long, four-sided enclosures.92 Once these 
pens were filled with protesters, those inside were barred from exiting for 
any reason.93 A lawsuit brought prior to the 2004 Republican National 
Convention in New York City sought to bar the use of pens.94 The district 
court did not bar the use of pens altogether or subject them to any form of 
heightened scrutiny; it merely required that the police policy dating to 
February 2003 be altered to provide improved ingress and egress from the 
pens.95 
As the discussion of the campaign "free speech zones" above indicates, 
the space around public officials has also become far more tightly regulated 
in recent years. Presidents, national candidates, and other high-level officials 
travel inside security "bubbles" for obvious and understandable safety 
reasons.96 But this spatial tactic is now routinely being used by public 
officials of various ranks and stations. To protest the fact that they did not 
yet have a labor contract, members of New York City police and firefighter 
unions recently attempted to trail Mayor Michael Bloomberg as he attended 
the 2004 Republican National Convention.97 A federal district court upheld 
various security measures that the mayor's security detail and local police 
enforced against the unions and other protesters, including a half-block 
"bubble" or speech-free zone.98 The court rejected the union members' 
request that they be permitted to come within fifteen feet of the mayor to 
convey their specific message.99 
Finally, at an even finer level, the government has resorted to more 
physical spatial tactics to control dissent. On the final evening of the 2004 
Republican National Convention, nearly 1,800 protesters were arrested on 
the streets. 100 In addition to pens and other barricades, the police unveiled a 
new spatial technique: officers used large orange nets to divide and capture 
protesters. 101 Police, for example, were able to thwart a protest mounted by 
92. Preston, supra note 89, at B4. 
93. !d. 
94. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870. 
95. !d. at *29. 
96. See, e.g., Michael Settle, Bush Fans Flame of Freedom, HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 21,2005, 
at 1 (reporting that former presidents, leading politicians, judges, businessmen, family, and friends 
observed the inauguration from inside a security bubble); Wayne Washington, NATO Plan Nears; 
Bush Courts Turks, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2004, at Al (explaining that President Bush's 
security bubble kept him well away from protesters at the North American Treaty Organization 
summit in 2004); Rick Westhead eta!., Thousands Test Tight Security Bubble, TORONTO STAR, 
Dec. 1, 2004, at A03 (describing the security zone around President Bush during a visit to Canada, 
which contained thousands of police and Secret Service agents). 
97. Preston, supra note 6, at B7. 
98. !d. 
99. /d. 
100. Michael Slackman & Diane Cardwell, Tactics by Police Mute the Protesters, and Their 
Messages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, atAl. 
101. /d. 
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bicyclists by throwing a net across a public street. 102 Casting nets is not a 
finely tailored spatial technique .. As might be expected, authorities snared a 
number of innocent bystanders. 103 
Beginning from a very sound premise, namely that a degree of order 
and safety must be maintained, authorities have effectively controlled and 
even suppressed core political dissent by designing and constructing tactical 
places for it. Cages, zones, pens, and even nets are the new weapons . of 
choice in the clash between security and expressive freedom. Spatial tactics 
are fundamentally altering expressive and associative rights in public places. 
B. Abortion Clinic "Buffer Zones" and "Bubbles" 
The use of spatial tactics is not limited to political demonstrations. 
Social and political protest have also been geometrically confined and 
restrained in other situations. Indeed, spatial tactics first arose as a response 
to demonstrations outside abortion and other public health clinics. In this 
context, as in others, government has relied upon spatial tactics to confine 
and control speakers who wish to convey upsetting and offensive messages. 
Demonstrators at abortion clinics have utilized provocative language, 
and sometimes even resorted to violence, to urge patients to reconsider their 
decision to have an abortion. 104 Incidents of physical violence or property 
destruction are, of course, subject to prosecution under the criminal laws. 
Officials have relied instead on prophylactic spatial tactics to defuse the 
environment around abortion clinics. Delivery of the protestors' message at 
or near these clinics has raised two distinct spatial problems. First, the space 
around the clinic must be generally free of obstructions, so that patrons can 
gain access to the property. Second, legislators and courts have sought to 
provide clinic visitors some minimal "personal space" or privacy as they seek 
to visit the clinics. There must be, they have reasoned, some line past which 
102. !d. 
103. !d. (noting that police mistakes included "the arrest of several innocent bystanders and 
nonviolent protesters"). See generally Michael Slackman & Ann Farmer, 25,000 Abortion-Rights 
Advocates March to City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A27 (describing the ordeal 
encountered by 264 people swept up by police nets, including one innocent bystander who spent 
sixteen hours in a holding cell); Greg B. Smith, Lawsuits Likely to Sing Blues over NYPD Tactics, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 4, 2004, at 13 (stating that police officials had yet to address "complaints 
that dozens of innocent people were wrongfully arrested as they walked near protests when police 
used orange nets to sweep up everyone" during the GOP convention). 
104. E.g., Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d I, 7 (Tex. 1993) ("Throughout the nation, peaceful anti-
abortion picketing has given way to increasing incidents of violence, vandalism and trespass, as 
well as blockading of clinic entrances denying women their right to seek reproductive health 
services, including abortions."); see, e.g., Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 
363 (1997) ("Counselors would walk alongside targeted women headed toward the clinics, handing 
them literature and talking to them in an attempt to persuade them not to get an abortion. 
Unfortunately, if the women continued toward the clinics and did not respond positively to the 
counselors, such peaceful efforts at persuasion often devolved into 'in your face' yelling, and 
sometimes into pushing, shoving, and grabbing."). 
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a protester cannot advance in order to make his case, an embodied space that 
ensures free physical movement and psychological repose. 
Legislatures and courts have developed two distinct spatial tactics to 
address these issues. First, in the early 1990s, "buffer zones" became the 
chosen spatial technique for ensuring patients' access to clinic properties. 105 
Federal and state legislatures instituted various lines or boundaries to control 
the spaces around abortion clinics. 106 Courts fashioned injunctive relief that 
also included specific spatial dimensions. 107 
Second, to protect patients' privacy and repose, the law developed what 
has come to be known as "the bubble." To illustrate, Colorado's law, 
enacted in 1993 and upheld in Hill v. Colorado, 108 required protesters to stay 
eight feet from anyone entering or leaving an abortion clinic, as long as the 
clinic visitor was within l 00 feet of the entrance. 109 The Court characterized 
this statute as a content-neutral "regulation of the places where some speech 
may occur."110 . The State's interests in protecting access to the clinics and 
women's right to privacy (on the public sidewalks) were deemed sufficiently 
important and unrelated to the suppression of any social or political 
message. 111 The 100-foot buffer zone, along with an 8-foot embodied 
bubble, were considered adequately tailored to serve the State's important 
interests. 112 
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 113 the Court upheld an injunctive 
"speech-free buffer zone" that prohibited all demonstrations within 36 feet of 
an abortion clinic. 114 This effectively displaced anti-abortion protesters. For 
105. See Nat Hentoff, Protesting Up-Close, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1995, at A21 (noting that 
"[ m ]unicipal ordinances and court injunctions ... have led to the establishment in a number of cities 
of buffer zones around abortion clinics"); see also George Flynn, Permanent Order Limits Abortion 
Foes, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1994, at Al3 (describing an injunction that established "permanent 
buffer zones against protests at [abortion] clinics and physicians' residences"); Jerry Gray, Bill 
Shields Abortion Clinics from Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at B6 (describing an attempt in 
New Jersey to pass a law creating a 100-foot buffer zone around healthcare centers). 
106. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (prohibiting 
intentionally injuring, intimidating, or physically interfering with any person seeking to obtain 
reproductive health services near a health care facility); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-122(3) 
(West 2004) (barring any person within 100 feet of a health care facility, defined to include abortion 
clinics, from approaching another person within eight feet of that other person, with the purpose of 
passing out a leaflet or engaging in "oral protest"). 
107. See, e.g., Schenk, 519 U.S. at 364 (holding that the district court's injunction provision 
banning demonstrations within fifteen feet of doorways or doorway entrances of abortion clinics 
was constitutional); United States v. Scott, 958 F. Supp. 761, 780-84 (D. Conn. 1997) (permanently 
enjoining an abortion protester from coming within fourteen feet of an abortion clinic's entrance), 
affd in part, rev 'din part sub nom. United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998). 
108. 530 u.s. 703 (2000). 
109. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 18-9-122 (West 2004). 
110. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719. 
111. /d. at 715-16,720. 
112. !d. at 730. 
113. 512 u.s. 753 (1994). 
114. !d. at 770. 
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instance, the buffer zone rendered the passing of information to prospective 
patients impossible. Notably, in Madsen the Court purported to impose a 
standard for injunctions that it described as "somewhat more·stringent" than 
the usual time, place, and manner standard. 115 Ordinarily courts emphasize 
that with regard to spatial tailoring, place regulations need not be the least 
restrictive alternative available to the state. 116 But in Madsen the Court noted 
that in order to be tailored an injunction must "burden no more speech than 
necessary to serve a significant government interest."117 According to the 
Court, this revised standard acknowledged that specific injunctive regulations 
of place raise greater content discrimination concerns than do generally 
applicable statutes. 118 Specifically, the Court observed that injunctions 
"carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do 
general ordinances."119 Even under the revised standard, however, the Court 
had little difficulty concluding that the 36-foot buffer satisfied the First 
Amendment. 120 
Finally, the Court upheld another combination bubble-buffer zone in 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York. 121 The injunction in 
Schenck prohibited anti-abortion demonstrators from demonstrating within 
15 feet of abortion clinic entrances and driveways, and within 15 feet of 
vehicles and patients entering or leaving a clinic. 122 The former restriction 
was referred to as a "fixed" buffer zone, and the latter as a "floating" buffer 
zone. 123 The Court held that the fixed buffer zone satisfied the Madsen 
standard. 124 The 15-foot zone, the Court held, did not burden more speech 
than necessary to serve the government's interests in traffic flow, public 
safety, and preservation of women's freedom to seek abortion services.125 
The floating buffer zone, however, was invalidated on overbreadth 
grounds. 126 Among other infirmities, the Court noted that the floating zone 
conceivably applied even to those who lined the sidewalks and curbs to 
115. /d. at 765. 
116. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 726 ("As we have emphasized on more than one occasion, when 
a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy 
the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving 
the statutory goal."); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (reaffirming "that a 
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the 
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least 
intrusive means of doing so"). 
117. 512 U.S. at 765. 
118. Id. at 764. 
119. /d. 
120. Id. at 770. 
121. 519 u.s. 357 (1997). 
122. Id. at 366 n.3. 
123. Id. at 361. 
124. /d. at 380-83. 
125. Id. at 376. 
126. Id. at 377. 
2006] Speech and Spatial Tactics 601 
chant, shout, or hold signs. 127 Moreover, the Court noted that it would have 
been nearly impossible to enforce such a floating zone. 128 
In this context, as in the larger political arena, officials have turned to 
spatial tactics to defuse a highly charged expressive environment. The areas 
near abortion clinics now resemble spatial grids. They are marked with 
buffer zones and protective listener bubbles. Spatial tactics substantially 
burden rights of association and expression near clinics. They confine 
speakers to fixed areas. They facilitate separation, avoidance, and 
surveillance of offensive speakers and speech. They rob speakers of 
proximity and immediacy that is critical to their message. They substantially 
burden, if they do not entirely prohibit, face-to-face speaker and listener 
interaction. And they do all of these things in what remain nominally public 
places. 
C. University "Free Speech" Zones 
Spatial tactics have also become a means of controlling and disciplining 
expression on university campuses. In the 1980s and 1990s, several 
universities adopted "speech codes" to combat sexual and racial 
harassment. 129 For a number of reasons, not least of which were the 
vagueness and overbreadth of the codes, as well as their sometimes evident 
purpose to suppress certain viewpoints, the codes were invalidated by 
courts. 130 
This, of course, did not eradicate the problem of harassing, disturbing, 
and racist expression on college campuses. University administrators, 
unwilling or unable to suppress these ideas outright, sought other means to 
limit and control such expression. Many universities, among them Texas 
Tech University, New Mexico State University, West Virginia University, 
the University of Mississippi, and Florida State University, turned to spatial 
tactics. 131 These institutions replaced their free speech codes with free 
speech zones. Here, in yet another charged context, the government sought 
to quell social and political unrest by turning to place. 
Naturally, university officials, like other government officials, insist that 
free speech zones serve interests unrelated to the content of the expression-
127. /d. 
128. /d. at 378 n.9. 
129. William Celis, Universities Reconsidering Bans on Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
1992, at Al3 (noting that an estimated "100 colleges and universities in the United States have 
adopted codes that prohibit discriminatory or threatening remarks . . . based on race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation"). 
130. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (striking down 
the university's speech code as overbroad and vague); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He 
Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 477 (arguing that 
universities had drafted vague and overbroad regulations to appease "various, widely diverging 
political constituencies" and with "only passing concern for ... free speech"). 
13 1. See generally Davis, supra note 9 (describing the use of campus speech zones). 
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interests like safety and pedagogical mission. 132 In many cases, however, the 
dimensions of the campus zones leave substantial room for doubt. At West 
Virginia University, for example, the original speech zone policy limited 
expressive activity to only two small zones on a very large campus.133 
Faculty members described these zones as being "roughly the size of a 
classroom."134 Under pressure from students and faculty, the university 
expanded the number of zones from two to seven. 135 Still, the space 
encompassed within the expanded area of seven free speech zones amounted 
to no more than 5% of the total campus. 136 Ultimately, faced with litigation 
and, perhaps more importantly, negative publicity, the university relented 
and abandoned its speech zone policy. 137 
New Mexico State University similarly set aside three small free speech 
zones. 138 Plaintiffs alleged that two of those areas had virtually no pedestrian 
traffic at all. 139 Faced with bad publicity and community dissent, the 
university adopted a new policy that did not utilize speech zones. 140 This has 
been a relatively consistent pattern, as administrators first turn to tactical 
zoning only to later reverse their policies in the face of litigation and public 
pressure. 141 This does not mean that the zoning issue is not alive on 
campuses today. Unchallenged zoning policies, of course, remain in place. 142 
And the temptation to turn to spatial tactics is certain to recur with each 
episode of campus agitation and umest. Indeed, a lawsuit was recently filed 
challenging the University of Maryland's restrictions on outdoor public 
132. See, e.g., Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that, 
due to safety concerns, a university had a legitimate interest in restricting speech to certain areas); 
Auburn Alliance For Peace & Justice v. Martin, 684 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-78 (M.D. Ala. 1988) 
(noting that a university's student affairs office may restrict speech to certain facilities to avoid 
conflict with academic activities), aff'd, 853 F.2d 931 (II th Cir. 1988). 
133. Davis, supra note 9, at 294-95. 
134. Id. at 295. 
135. See Josh Hafenbrack, Protest Freedoms Reviewed; WVU President Calls Regulations 
'Practical Necessity', CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 14, 2002, at I A (noting that under the 
university's new policy "[c]rowds larger than 15 are now confined to the areas near [the student 
union], like under the old [speech] policy, plus six additional spots"). 
136. See Tara Tuckwil!er, Bush Twins Talk at WVU; Protesters Nearby, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2004, at IC, available at 2004 WLNR 1198611 ("And at WVU two years ago, 
protests were confined to 'free speech zones'-less than 5 percent of campus where university 
officials had decided people would be allowed to speak freely."). 
137. Davis, supra note 9, at 294. 
138. Randal C. Archibold, Student Life; Boxing in Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 
4A. 
139. David L. Hudson Jr., Free Speech Zones, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER: FREE SPEECH ON 
PUBLIC COLLEGE CAMPUSES, 
http://www .firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/pubcollege/topic.aspx?topic=free-speech _zones. 
140. Archibold, supra note 138, at 4A. 
141. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 296 (describing how California's Citrus Community 
College rescinded policies establishing speech zones in the face of a lawsuit). 
142. See HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE ET AL., FIRE'S GUIDE TO FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 143 
(2005) (noting the increasing prevalence of free speech zones on college campuses). 
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speaking and leafleting.143 The university reportedly limited public speaking 
on its 1 ,500-acre campus to a single stage, while limiting the distribution of 
literature to certain designated sidewalk space. 144 
Although no court has specifically ruled on the constitutionality of 
campus free speech zones, university administrators have some reason to be 
confident of their validation. A federal district court recently examined the 
speech policy adopted by Texas Tech University Law School.145 The policy 
included among its provisions the designation of a "free speech area."146 The 
area, referred to as the "Gazebo," was a "free-standing structure of 
approximately 400 square feet adjaeent to the Student Union building."147 
The plaintiff was initially asked by the university to confine his expressive 
activities to this area, although he was eventually permitted to speak at a 
location approximately 20 feet from the one he had requested. 148 The 
plaintiff filed suit complaining that the policy violated his First Amendment 
rights. 149 Based upon the "character of a public university campus," the 
district court determined that the park areas, sidewalks, streets, and other 
"common areas ... are public forums, at least for the University's students, 
irrespective of whether the University has so designated them or n6t."150 ln 
these areas, heightened scrutiny would apply to any content-based speech 
restrictions. 151 The court treated the "free speech area," the Gazebo, as a 
designated public forum subject to the usual standards for content-neutral 
place regulation. 152 However, it ignored the propriety of zoning itself and 
ultimately invalidated the university's policy, not because it zoned speech in 
this manner, but because its requirement that students obtain permission prior 
to speaking was overly burdensome. 153 
There have been few decisions specifically addressing the 
constitutionality of campus "free speech zones.'1 Universities that have been 
challenged have thus far tended to capitulate to public and legal pressure to 
abandon the tactic. But the temptation to seek to discipline and control 
campus expression is real. Speech zones remain in place on a number of 
campuses today. Given courts' treatment of zoning generally, and tactical 
places specifically, there is no reason to believe that courts will treat these 
143. See AM. CIVIL LiBERTIES UNION, supra note 23, at 6 (discussing protest restrictions on 
college campuses after September 11, 2001). 
144. /d. 
145. Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
146. /d. at 856. 
147. ld. at 866 n.l8. Under a later, "interim" policy, this area was expanded to include other 
"forum areas" for expression. /d. 
148. /d. at 856-57. 
149. /d. at 857. After the suit was brought, the university amended its rules and adopted a new 
"interim policy," against which the plaintiff brought a facial challenge. /d. 
150. /d. at 858, 861. 
151. /d. at 862. 
152. /d. at 862, 868. 
153. /d. at 869-70. 
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speech zones as anything other than content-neutral regulations of the place 
of expression. Campus speech zones are, at least, far more likely to survive 
scrutiny than the campus speech codes they replaced. 
D. "Free Speech" and "Speech-Free" Zones in Other Public Places 
Increasingly, public places are being partitioned into free speech and 
speech-free zones. The upshot is that one makes a point in the designated 
places, or one does not make it at all. 
Some type of zoning has been applied to, among other spaces, 
airports,' 54 schools, 155 suburbs,' 56 sports arenas,' 57 military bases,' 58 polling 
places, 159 churches, 160 courthouses, 161 and other common areas. 162 Spatial 
tactics are everywhere; even areas around cemeteries and funerals are now 
subject to spatial restrictions in several states. 163 Some of these spatial tactics 
are referred to as "free speech" zones. 164 The name certainly implies speech 
154. See, e.g., ISKCON Miami, Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 147 F.3d 1282, 1290-91 (lith Cir. 
1998) (upholding the designation of eight "First Amendment zones" within an airport for the 
distribution of literature); Springfield v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 950 F. Supp. 1482, 1485 
(S.D. Cal. 1996) (examining an ordinance limiting expressive activity within an airport to a handful 
of 10-by-14 foot "Authorized Solicitation/Free Speech Zones"). 
155. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, IOl-02 (1972) (rejecting a 150-foot 
protest buffer zone around schools as unconstitutional). 
156. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1996) (examining a "[r]estricted 
picketing zone" that banned picketing within 200 feet of residences). 
157. See, e.g., Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving 
a First Amendment challenge brought by a bookseller to an ordinance prohibiting "peddling" of 
merchandise within 1,000 feet of the United Center, "home of the Chicago Blackhawks professional 
hockey team"). 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding a probation 
term imposing a 250-foot buffer zone around a submarine base). 
I 59. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 
738, 748 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding a "campaign-free zone" within 100 feet of a polling place's 
entrance); Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a 500-foot campaign-
free zone); Freeman v. Burson, 802 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. 1990) (involving challenges to statutes 
prohibiting the solicitation of votes within a 100-foot radius of polling places on election day), 
rev'd, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
160. See, e.g., Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(upholding a city ordinance prohibiting demonstrations within 8 feet of entrances to places of 
worship). 
161. See, e.g., Griderv. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739,750-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding a "buffer 
zone" around a courthouse for security reasons during a Ku Klux Klan rally); see also Los Angeles 
Bans Ticket Challenge Assistance, THENEWSPAPER.COM, Dec. 8, 2005, 
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/08/824.asp (noting that the Los Angeles County Court has 
issued rules prohibiting "education or counseling" within I 00 feet of a courthouse in response to 
protesters' initiation oflegal challenges to red light camera tickets). 
162. See, e.g., Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the designation of 
three 10-by-10 foot "free speech zones" located in a privately leased, outdoor public area owned by 
Portland City and challenged in a suit brought by street preachers). 
163. See supra note 10. 
164. See, e.g., Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d at 558 (noting that "plaintiffs have also, on occasion, 
violated the free speech zones"); Springfield v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 950 F. Supp. 1482, 
1485 (S.D. Cal. 1996). 
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facilitation, but the spaces tend to be quite small in relation to the area of 
public space that is then deemed off limits to expressive activity. 165 Other 
tactics are sometimes referred to as designated "speech-free zones."166 
These zones, as their name implies, create spaces where speech is expressly 
prohibited. 167 They tend to be much larger in dimension than "free speech" 
zones. 168 The two basic types of zones are, of course, closely related; 
whenever a "free speech" zone is created, the unaffected space becomes a de 
facto "speech-free" zone. 
As noted, this resort to spatial tactics to control speech in public places 
has become the norm. In a word, spatial tactics have become 
institutionalized. Today it is the rare public facility, institution, or space that 
does not have a free speech policy. Such policies now routinely provide for 
tactical places where expressive activity is permitted. The Cow Palace in 
San Francisco, for example, adopted a "First Amendment Expression Policy" 
that prohibited individuals from "demonstrating" outside the Palace except in 
designated "free expression zones."169 A "demonstration" was defined to 
include "oral advocacy within 75 feet from any point along the front entrance 
and/or in the fire zones."170 In other words, the policy established a 75-foot 
"speech-free" zone adjacent to the Palace. The policy further provided for 
the creation of three "free expression zones onsite for purposes of 
demonstrations."171 All three "free expression zones" were placed on the 
perimeter of a parking lot outside the Palace. 172 The zones were each 
roughly the size of a parking space; two of the zones were IO-by-20 feet, and 
the third was 16-by- I8 feet. 173 All of the "free expression zones" were 
"located between 200 and 265 feet from the main entrance doors to the 
arena."174 None of the zones provided any meaningful access to patrons 
165. See SILVERGLATE ET AL., supra note 142, at 143-44 (observing that because free speech 
zones only accounted for 1% of West Virginia University, the remaining 99% of the campus 
effectively constituted "Censorship Zones"); see also supra notes 154-162 (describing the 
exceptionally small size of many free speech zones). 
166. See, e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 661 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
constitutionality of a '"speech-free' zone," also referred to as a "'First-Amendment-free zone"'). 
167. See Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 A.2d 1260, 1272 (N.J. 1994) ("The paragraph-
three restriction effectively creates a speech-free or buffer zone around the Center: defendants may 
not engage in expressive activity in front of the Center because they must remain across the 
street."). 
168. Compare Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 2002) ("designat[ing] three free speech 
zones ... each approximately 10 feet by 10 feet in size"), and Springfield, 950 F. Supp. at 1485 
("allow[ing] individuals or groups to engage in these prohibited activities only in a handful of 10' x 
14' 'Authorized Solicitation/Free Speech' zones"), with Kirkeby, 92 F.3d at 660 (involving a 
speech-free zone that prohibited protesting within 200 feet of a person's house). 
169. See Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the Cow 
Palace's "First Amendment Expression Policy"). 
170. /d. at 853. 
171. /d. 
172. /d. at 854. 
173. /d. 
174. /d. 
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walking from the parking lots to the Palace. 175 This is now a typical spatial 
arrangement in the areas surrounding public accommodations. 
In sum, there has been a remarkable recent rise in the government's 
resort to spatial tactics to control and discipline expression, particularly 
expression that agitates, threatens, disturbs, or carries a message of political 
protest. Generally speaking, the free speech and speech-free zones described 
in this Part are accorded a minimal level of judicial scrutiny. As the Boston 
speech cage and countless other existing speech zones demonstrate, the 
"intermediate" level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral regulations of 
place does not ordinarily bar the use of such spatial tactics. Content-neutral 
regulations are acceptable so long as they purport to serve a substantial 
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of 
communication. 176 As applied, these are very minimal standards. As one 
scholar has observed: "The government interest and tailoring requirements 
are quite close to the rational basis standard applied to regulations that do 
not affect fundamental rights at all." 177 
This permissive manipulation of place should disturb a society so 
rightfully proud of its commitment to expressive freedom, particularly its 
tolerance of public dissent. These spatial tactics are creating public places 
that not only fail to facilitate public dissent but are hostile to it. As discussed 
in greater detail in Parts III and IV, tactical places suppress certain 
viewpoints, thereby distorting the marketplace of social and political 
discourse. They brand protesters as inherently dangerous members of 
society. They create an environment in which protesters and others who 
express divisive ideas are segregated, shunned, and ultimately avoided. 
Spatial tactics, then, are not .run-of-the-mill regulations of the place where 
speech may occur. 
II. Place as Res 
It is difficult at first to comprehend how something like the Boston 
speech cage, the "internment camp" the district court described as "a 
symbolic affront to the role of free expression,"178 could survive First 
Amendment scrutiny. How is it that place can be so liberally manipulated, in 
this and the various other examples just discussed, to control the exercise of 
fundamental expressive rights? · The puzzle becomes less baffling once one 
closely examines the theoretical and doctrinal roots of the First Amendment 
175. One zone was located at the bottom of a stairway and offered no opportunity to pass out 
leaflets or speak to patrons; another zone was located such that patrons were separated from 
demonstrators by barritades and moving cars, making communication "virtually impossible." !d. 
176. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
177. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 
615,644 (1991) (emphasis added). 
178. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 
74-75 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
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concept of place. This Part examines the current conception of place, the one 
that accounts for the constitutional doctrine of place. Part III will sketch a 
reconceptualization of place that views it as distinctly expressive. Part IV 
will examine the doctrinal implications of the conception of expressive place. 
It will suggest an approach to spatial tactics that takes into account the 
intersection of speech and spatiality in tactical places. 
The permissive treatment of spatial tactics can be definitively traced to 
the core idea that place is merely res-a neutral container, a backdrop for 
expression, an inanimate property defined by normatively neutral boundaries. 
Indeed, the principal presumption of the First Amendment doctrine of 
place-the combination of the public forum and time, place, and manner 
doctrines-is that speech and spatiality have little to do with one another. 
Neither the government's choice to keep a forum closed to expression, for 
example, nor its decision to significantly displace or confine speech is 
presently treated as if it raises substantial First Amendment concerns. This 
judicial attitude springs from the Court's initial decision, one neither initially 
nor subsequently justified with any theoretical rigor, to treat place solely as 
property or res. For if place is nothing more than a public resource, the 
power to regulate, manage, and control it belongs primarily to. the state. 
That, as we shall see, accurately summarizes the history and current position 
of place. 
A. State-As-Owner of Place 
When place first entered constitutional and, specifically, judicial 
consciousness, public places like streets, sidewalks, and parks were the 
principal contested public areas. To the legal and judicial mind, these public 
places were naturally considered a genus of property. This meant, of course, 
that someone or something owned them and their corresponding bundles of 
rights. 
In the nineteenth century, the sovereign state owned these places. So 
said Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., sitting as a justice of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court. In Commonwealth v. Davis, Davis made a speech 
on the Boston Common without a permit from the mayor. 179 Holmes, 
speaking for the court, upheld Davis's conviction under a state licensing 
law. 180 The future Supreme Court Justice said: "For the Legislature 
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public 
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than 
for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."181 The Supreme 
179. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 N.E. 577 (Mass. 1886) and 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895) 
(disposing of a defendant charged under the statute requiring government permission to "deliver a 
sermon, lecture, address, or discourse on the [Boston! Common"), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. 
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
180. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. at 113. 
181. !d. 
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Court affirmed on similar logic: "The right to absolutely exclude all right to 
use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under what 
circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the 
lesser." 182 
Thus, just as a private homeowner controlled access to and activity upon 
his lawn or front porch, so did the state own and control the streets, 
sidewalks, and parks-what we now refer to as "traditional public forums." 
A citizen could no more occupy a public park without the state's permission 
than he could sit in his neighbor's back yard without an invitation. In other 
words, at the very moment it entered constitutional consideration, place was 
conceptualized as nothing more than res. The bundle of rights in the res of 
place initially belonged exclusively to the state. 
B. State-As-Trustee of Place 
It should come as no particular surprise that this ownership theory did 
not survive. Much of the revolutionary past had been acted out on the public 
streets ·and in other public places. Although the concept of state-as-owner of 
wide swaths of public space officially survived for some four decades, it was 
seemingly formally abandoned in Hague v. C/0. 183 In Hague, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a Jersey City ordinance that imposed a permit requirement 
for speech in all public places. 184 In now famous dictum, the Court stated 
that wherever title to the streets and public parks may lie, these spaces have 
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions."185 
This dictum subtly transformed the state from the owner of public 
streets and parks to the trustee of the res of such public places. Although the 
change in state status and function was significant, it occurred without any 
theoretical reconsideration of the basic concept of place. The Hague Court 
merely replaced state-as-owner with another familiar legal property concept, 
namely state-as-trustee. Place remained res. 
What did change was the nature of the state's relationship to the res. As 
a result of the state's transition from owner to trustee, the focus of this 
relationship shifted away from the state's right to exclude persons from the 
res. The state appeared to have lost this power, at least with regard to streets 
and parks. Instead, judicial attention turned to setting the operative rules of 
the metaphorical trust. As trustee, the state had an obligation to preserve and 
manage the res of public space for the benefit of the people, the putative trust 
beneficiaries. Like any other trustee, the state had an obligation to do so 
182. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. at 48. 
183. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
184. Id. at 500, 518. 
185. Id. at 515 (emphasis added). 
2006] Speech and Spatial Tactics 609 
neutrally, without official bias concerning the substance of what a speaker or 
user said in these places. As trustee, the state was to perform several basic 
tasks: to guarantee some minimal right of access to the public streets, 
sidewalks, and parks; to resolve competing claims to the res; and to generally 
preserve the condition of the res for public use. 
As noted, the metaphorical trust did not permit the trustee-state to 
completely deny citizens access to the trust res. "Such use of the streets and 
public places," the Hague Court said, "has, from ancient times, been a part of 
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens."186 Some minimal 
right of access had passed to citizen-beneficiaries through the mythical trust 
instrument. Indeed, many of the early cases involving consideration of 
access to public streets and sidewalks emphasized this basic right of 
access. 187 This was, of course, the famous era of the Jehovah's Witnesses, 
who sought to distribute handbills and other literature on the streets, where 
people could generally be found. 188 It was in this era that the Court most 
jealously guarded the beneficiary's right of access. The public streets and 
parks were not places where listeners could expect to be protected from 
offensive speech. Indeed, the Court emphasized in particular the state's 
obligation to protect the dissemination of "novel and unconventional ideas 
[that] might disturb the complacent."189 The trust provided the unwilling 
listener no general right of privacy on the public ways; the First Amendment 
in this respect protected a robust public square. 
But if the property ownership model upset deeply felt republican 
sensibilities, the idea that public places were to be simply thrown open to the 
masses threatened order and, perhaps ultimately, the rule oflaw. The state is, 
of course, no ordinary trustee. It is at once trustee and sovereign, and in the 
latter capacity possesses substantial police powers. To further the res 
metaphor, these powers might be considered part of a metaphorical 
addendum to the trust instrument. By virtue of these special powers, the state 
is authorized to resolve competing claims to the res. As the Court observed, 
some regulation of public places like streets was necessary "'to prevent 
confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure convenient use of 
the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder. "'190 So 
long as the state was not given absolute discretion to exclude persons from 
the trust res, for instance through an unbridled licensing scheme, it would be 
186. /d. 
187. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (striking down ban on distribution 
of literature). 
188. See Kalven, supra note 26, at 1 (noting the early influence of Jehovah's Witnesses on the 
development of the public forum concept). 
189. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
190. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (quoting State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508 
(N.H. 1940)); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (stating that "two 
parades cannot march on the same street simultaneously, and government may allow only one"). 
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permitted, as any trustee must be, to resolve competing claims to the res. 191 
There was no apparent reason to suppose that the state, as trustee, would fail 
to perform this task in a neutral and objective manner. 192 
In addition to resolving competing claims of access, the trustee-state 
was also supposed to ensure that no beneficiary or group of beneficiaries 
substantially interfered with the primary purpose for which streets and other 
public thoroughfares exist. In fact, the origins of the "time, place, and 
manner" doctrine lie here, in the state's power to preserve the res for its 
primary use. 193 The earliest spatial restrictions focused on ensuring the free 
flow of traffic on public ways. 194 As the Court observed in one early case, 
"[A] person could not exercise [First Amendment rights] by taking his stand 
in the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and 
maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic." 195 As well, "[A] group of 
distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon 
across the street and to allow no pedestrian to pass who did not accept a 
tendered leaflet."196 Nor, of course, would one be "justified in ignoring the 
familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey 
the municipal command."197 
These are exceptionally easy cases. Note in particular the evident 
neutrality of these sorts of spatial concerns-two conflicting parades or 
processions; speeches in the middle of crowded streets; the outright blockage 
of all pedestrian traffic. The state, no less than any ordinary trustee, must be 
empowered to combat this sort of confusion and disorder when it impacts the 
res of public place. Indeed, it has an obligation under the trust to do so. 198 
There was thus no reason to question the state's neutrality, or to look for any 
covert biases in early spatial regulations. Indeed, it was nearly impossible to 
191. See Cox, 312 U.S. at 576 (agreeing with the state court that because the statute did not vest 
the licensing board with "arbitrary power or an unfettered discretion," the state could still issue 
licenses for parades or processions in order to "giv[ e] the public authorities notice ... to afford 
opportunity for proper policing"). 
192. See id ("If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades 
or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without 
unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the streets."). 
193. See id (noting that with regard to a license for a parade or procession, the state court had 
considered factors of "time, place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience" when 
defming the duties of the licensing authority and potential licensee); cf Steven L. Winter, An 
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1885-1901 
(1991) (noting that Hague's "time, place, and manner" doctrine for public spaces was developed in 
accordance with changing conceptions of the purposes of such public spaces). 
194. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ("Municipal authorities, as trustees 
for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of 
people and property, the primary purpose for which the streets are dedicated."). 
195. !d 
196. !d 
197. Cox, 312 U.S. at 574. 
198. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953) ("The principles of the First 
Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may 
gather around him at any public place ... a group for discussion or instruction."). 
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detect any connection between speech and spatiality in these circumstances. 
The state was not at this point segmenting, zoning, or partitioning public 
places. It was dealing with the res of place as it was, as it existed. In 
managing place in this fashion, the state could plausibly argue that it was 
managing things like traffic and competing uses, not expression and dissent. 
More or less simultaneously with its initial consideration of spatial 
regulations, the Court was also beginning to confront issues regarding the 
appropriate timing and manner of expression in public places. Trust 
beneficiaries obviously could not be permitted to use the trust res at all 
hours, or in any manner they wished. Early cases emphasized, for example, 
that one could not claim a constitutional right to disturb the peace by blaring 
loudspeakers in the middle of the night on a residential street. 199 So the 
metaphorical trust was amended once again, this time to include some degree 
of state control over the time and manner of expression as well as over its 
place. And as with place, so long as the trustee-state did not use time or 
manner as a pretext for content discrimination, it would be permitted to 
regulate these aspects of the expressive environment as well. 
The concept of place as trust res was simply a reflexive substitution of 
one familiar legal property model for another. Although the state did not 
own public places, its grip on them remained substantial under the model of 
trusteeship. Note that from the beginning, the Court's conception of place 
was primarily instrumental. The trustee was empowered to preserve "the 
primary uses of streets and parks."200 Of course, the primary use of the 
streets is the conveyance of people and vehicles, not thoughts and ideas. 
Parks exist primarily for entertainment, not expression. Moreover, pursuant 
to the trust, expressive and associative rights extended only to public places 
"where people have a right to be for [speech] purposes. "201 It fell principally 
to the trustee-state to determine the "appropriate" place for the exercise of 
expressive rights?02 At least initially, this did not entail expressive zoning 
and partitioning. The state was able to manage the res of place while still 
providing ample space for public discourse, including often uncomfortable 
face-to-face interactions?03 
199. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding !he general regulation of 
sound trucks); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (supporting a licensing scheme for the 
use of amplifiers in public places). 
200. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,276 (1951). 
201. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,578 (1965). 
202. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[One} is not to have the exercise of his 
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on !he plea that it may be exercised in some 
other place." (emphasis added)). 
203. See, e.g., id. at 160 ("So long as legislation [limiting access to public streets} does not 
abridge !he constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through 
speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of !hose using !he 
streets."). 
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C. State-As-Proprietor of Place 
Things became much more complicated when speakers sought access to 
public places beyond the streets, sidewalks, and parks. The expressive 
topography, the public space the state was entrusted to manage, rapidly 
expanded to include a range of new places. Beginning in the 1960s, speakers 
sought access to a variety of public places where potential listeners might be 
found. They demanded access to public libraries,204 jails,205 buses,206 military 
bases/07 schools,208 theaters,209 and mailboxes.21° Consequently, the Court 
was forced to approach place more systematically. Having chosen property 
as a conceptual model for place, the Court was obliged to confront the 
inherent malleability of this concept. The idea of "place," it turned out, was 
flexible enough to encompass even metaphysical places, such as candidate 
debates,211 charitable campaigns,212 and government programs.213 
While the trusteeship functions involved managing the res of streets, 
sidewalks, and parks, these new access claims raised far more substantial 
issues. Now a method was required for literally defining which places were 
open to expression, and which were not. And, of course, the Court had to 
204. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (holding that a state cannot use 
regulations as a pretext for imposing criminal penalties on protesters engaged in a lawful and 
peaceful protest against segregation within ~public library). 
205. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1966) (holding that the state could convict 
protesters under a trespassing statute for entering a nonpublic county jail where the arrests were 
made because of the trespass and not the content of the protest). 
206. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974) (holding that bus car 
cards were not a "public forum," and that the city, no less than any other proprietor, was entitled to 
make managerial decisions with regard to the advertisements it would accept). 
207. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976) (holding that protesters had no 
generalized constitutional right to make political speeches at a military base and that government 
and military authorities may apply objective and even-handed policies that designate military 
property a nonpublic forum). 
208. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (prohibiting the selective 
exclusion of certain picketing groups from protesting next to a school). 
209. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555-56 (1975) (holding that a 
municipal theater in which petitioners wished to present a musical was a public forum because it 
was "designed for and dedicated to expressive activities," and that the government was therefore not 
permitted to make content distinctions). 
210. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983) 
(holding that a school district could distinguish between two teachers' unions, only one of which 
was the official representative of the township's teachers, in determining access to the school 
system's interschool mailbox system). 
211. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (holding that a 
state-owned public television broadcaster, while subject to constitutional constraints applicable to 
nonpublic fora, can exclude certain candidates from participation in a televised debate if the 
decision is based on a "reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion"). 
212. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813 (1985) (holding 
that the government does not necessarily violate the First Amendment when it excludes certain 
political advocacy and legal defense groups from the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive 
aimed at federal employees). 
213. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (invalidating speech 
restrictions in connection with governmental funding). 
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determine who was going to decide this critical question, and with how 
much, if any, oversight. These were momentous decisions insofar as the 
exercise of public expressive rights were concerned. Indeed, they would 
determine the shape of the expressive topography for years to come. Here, 
then, was a most appropriate opportunity to rethink the idea of place. 
But there was to be no broad rethinking of place in this or, indeed, any 
subsequent era. Instead, the Court proceeded to further entrench the res 
concept. In an important article, Harry Kalven, Jr. interpreted certain cases 
from the civil rights period as recognizing the critical importance of place to 
expressive and associative rights.214 Kalven implicitly accepted the property 
or res model of place. He argued that a "First Amendment-easement" 
existed with respect to certain public places.215 Kalven opined that the public 
streets and parks, in particular, were a "forum" that speakers could 
"commandeer" in the quest to convince the public to support civil rights.216 
This, of course, turned the early ownership principle almost completely on its 
head. In the I970s and 1980s, the Court adopted Kalven's easement 
metaphor and "forum" terminology.217 But as the public forum doctrine's 
history demonstrates, the Court has never approached Kalven's enthusiasm 
for the power of place to facilitate First Amendment freedoms. It has 
soundly rejected the notion that speakers can commandeer public places. 
And it has steadfastly held to the notion that place is merely a form of 
property or res. 
Faced with the potential explosion of demand for place, the Court 
sought to control and simplify it through the vehicle of categorization.218 The 
entire mass of public space, the Court said, could be partitioned into "public" 
and "nonpublic" forums. 219 In the most recent iteration of the state's 
relationship to place, the Court essentially commissioned the state 
"proprietor" of all public places?20 Proprietorship vested the state with even 
more power over place than it exercised as trustee. Proprietorship meant that 
the state would be responsible for determining whether a public place, other 
than a public street, sidewalk, or park, was open to expressive activity at all. 
Thus, with regard to the vast majority of public places, the state was once 
214. Kalven, supra note 26. 
215. /d. at 13. 
216. /d. at 12. 
217. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: 
Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1221-22 (1984) 
(noting that Professor Kalven's "'public forum' has appeared in ... thirty-two Supreme Court 
decisions ... [and] two of these decisions were rendered prior to 1970 and thirteen of the thirty-two 
have been in the 1980's" (citations omitted)). 
218. See Massey, supra note 26, at 309 (observing that "the Court has formulated its public 
forum doctrine-which determines the amount of judicial scrutiny any particular speech restriction 
on public property receives-almost entirely by categorizing the property"). 
219. /d. 
220. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-26 (1990) (discussing the principle of 
governmental proprietorship of public places). 
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again owner of the res-it possessed the authority to exclude all expressive 
activity on these public properties. 
In doctrinal terms, there are now three familiar forum types. The 
"traditional public forum" is, at least ostensibly, the quintessential free 
speech zone. Such forums are identified with reference to "objective 
characteristics" of the res, such as whether, "by long tradition or by 
government fiat," the property has "been devoted to assembly and debate."221 
Streets, sidewalks, and parks are exemplary. In fact, the Court has indicated 
that they exhaust the category.222 In these places, ordinary trust rules apply: 
The state may not prohibit all expressive activity; it can enforce a regulation 
based upon content or viewpoint only if it can demonstrate a compelling 
purpose for doing so and can show that its distinction is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that purpose; and it can enforce reasonable, nondiscriminatory "time, 
place, and manner" regulations.223 There are two other types of forums. 
Neither category directly affects the constitutionality of spatial tactics. It is 
necessary to describe them, however, in order to accurately depict the 
Court's current conception of the expressive topography.224 In addition to 
traditional public forums, there are "designated" public forums. These 
expressive places are created only "by purposeful governmental action."225 
Mere inertia or inaction is not enough; a speaker cannot claim any right of 
access unless the state has intentionally opened the forum to public 
discourse. 226 That intention must be clearly manifested.227 Objective 
indicators of state intent include such things as "the policy and practice of the 
government" and the "nature of the property and its compatibility with 
221. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983). 
222. Indeed, the Court has "rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends 
beyond its historic confines." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678. 
223. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984) (noting that time, 
place, and manner regulations must be justified without regard to the content of speech, be 
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant [government] interest," and "leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication"). 
224. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677. 
225. /d. 
226. See id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)) {determining that once the government intentionally opens a forum for public dialogue, if a 
speaker in the class of people to which the forum is generally made available is excluded, then the 
government will be subject to strict scrutiny). 
227. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (explaining that when the government designates a public 
forum "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public disclosure," the Court looks to a 
number of "objective" indicators "to discern the government's intent"). Compare Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (holding that the state evidences a clear intent to create a public 
forum if it has intentionally opened a venue for public disclosure through an express policy of 
permitting its meeting facilities to be open to specified persons), with U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council 
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (holding that the Court "will not find that a 
public fornm has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, ... nor will [the 
Court] infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the property 
is inconsistent with expressive activity"). 
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expressive activity."228 Assuming the state has manifested the requlSlte 
intent, the rules of engagement in terms of regulating expression are 
precisely the same in this sort of forum as in the traditional public forum. 229 
All remaining government properties are essentially speech-free zones; 
they are either nonpublic forums or are not expressive forums at all.230 
Expressive rights in these places are nearly nonexistent. Here the state's 
relationship to place is closest to the ownership metaphor.231 It may make 
distinctions in access based upon subject matter as well as on the basis of 
speaker identity.232 Regulation of access must only be "reasonable and not 
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker's view."233 
Public forum doctrine has been severely criticized, not least for the 
absence of any theoretical foundation for the haphazardly derived and 
simplistic categorical approach.234 It is unnecessary to revisit those critiques 
here. The upshot is that the Court has fashioned a very anemic expressive 
topography, one that does not leave much space for public speech.235 The 
Court seems not to have been prepared for the complexity and variability of 
228. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
229. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) 
(holding that the government, when it opens a designated puhlic forum, "is bound by the same 
standards as apply in a traditional public forum"). 
230. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78. I have purposefully excluded from this general description 
the idea of the "limited public forum" that, as others have noted, is a doctrinally incoherent concept. 
See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public 
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1757 (1987) (arguing that the Court's subsequent treatments of 
"limited" public forums "shrink[] the limited public forum to such insignificance that it is difficult 
to imagine how a plaintiff could ever suceessfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain access to such a 
forum"). 
231. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (reiterating that the government has essentially all the property 
rights of a private owner with respect to public property that is not a forum for public 
communication). 
232. !d. at 49. 
233. !d. 
234. Representative critiques are numerous. Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to 
Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287, 1308-09 (1979); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of 
the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 110 
(1986); Farber & Nowak, supra note 217, at 1234-35; David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in 
Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 175, 
178-79 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247 (1976); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-
Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 93 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public 
Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 341 (1986). Robert Post 
has provided the most rigorous theoretical justification for the Court's public forum doctrine. See 
generally Post, supra note 230. 
235. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 217, at 1234 (arguing that the public forum doctrine has 
"only confused judicial opinions by diverting attention from the real first amendment issues 
involved in the cases"); Post, supra note 27, at 1777 (concluding that the public forum doctrine's 
"present focus 'on the eharacter of the property at issue' is a theoretical dead end, because there is 
no satisfactory theory connecting the classification of government property with the exercise of the 
first amendment rights"). 
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place that confronted it in the 1960s. ln the face of this spatial complexity, 
the Court clung to the familiar concept of res. 1t did very briefly entertain a 
speech-facilitative conception of place, one that would require that speakers 
be provided access to space so long as their expressive activity was 
"compatible" with it.236 But for reasons unexplained, the Court rapidly 
retreated to a standard that placed no obligation whatsoever on the state to 
facilitate expression by making room for it.237 The state-proprietor, like the 
state-trustee, merely had to remain neutral with regard to content. As 
proprietor, the state decides whether undifferentiated "space" ever becomes 
expressive place. 
Throughout its development, the doctrine of place has treated the state's 
mapping of the expressive topography as a presumptively neutral endeavor. 
Forums are created objectively, based principally upon property management 
concerns. The time, place, and manner doctrine applies only where the state 
is neutral with regard to content, the presumption being that place itself has 
nothing to do with the substance of speech. For all that appears, then, place 
is neither counected to speech nor subject to manipulation by the state. Like 
any other res, place merely exists; it is a brute construct. Like water, air, or 
any other collective resource, place communicates nothing. It is merely 
location. 
III. Speech and Spatiality 
Place-as-res is an entrenched First Amendment concept. Indeed, some 
have suggested that it is too late in the day to alter this dominant conception 
of place. There is no denying that place is, in fundamental respects, a species 
of property. But it does not necessarily follow that res exhausts the place 
concept, or that we must accept that place has little or nothing to do with 
expression. The Court has never provided any theoretical basis or 
justification for confining place to this narrow conception. Thus, we need 
not feel bound by or beholden to it. 
The increasing use of spatial tactics described in Part I provides an 
occasion for rethinking the entrenched concept of place-as-res. What is the 
relationship between speech and spatiality? ls place really just an inert 
background? ls it a given, brute fact? Are all state regulations of place 
properly presumed content- and value-neutral? Similar questions regarding 
place bave been posed by scholars in a host of other disciplines, including 
sociology, anthropology, history, geography, architectural science, literary 
studies, and philosophy.238 Place was once mere background in these 
236. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (inquiring "whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a 
particular time"). 
23 7. See supra text accompanying notes 221-231. 
238. See, e.g., EDWARDS. CASEY, THE FATE OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY, at xi-xii 
(1997) (noting the "burgeoning interest in place" in various disciplines today, including 
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disciplines as well.239 But many scholars have recently rediscovered and 
reinvigorated place; they have brought it out of its background position into 
the foreground. 240 In order to achieve a fuller understanding of the 
implications of the state's use of spatial tactics, and ultimately of the 
intersection of speech and spatiality more generally, this Part seeks to do the 
same for place as it relates to First Amendment concerns. 
To understand the intersection of speech and spatiality, we must also 
"fashion[] a fresh face for place."241 This Part contends that place is not 
merely res; it is, as well, a distinct form and manifestation of expression. 
Tactical places do not simply regulate or relocate expressive behavior. They 
represent something more. A conception of place as distinctly expressive 
can help us understand what that something is. This conception shall be 
referred to as "expressive place." Unlike the undertheorized conception of 
place-as-res, "expressive place" has a rich intellectual pedigree, one with 
roots in several disciplines. Expressly rejecting the vision of place as inert 
backdrop, expressive place highlights the variability of place, the primacy of 
place to expression, the constructive nature of "place," and its dynamism or 
expressive qualities. Place can be a highly charged and purposeful construct, 
a repository of meaning, and a symbol of social and political control. 
Viewing tactical places in this light reveals the need for a more rigorous form 
of judicial scrutiny. Part IV sets forth arguments and specific proposals for 
approaching and analyzing tactical places, not as res or property but rather as 
expressive places. 
A. Expressive Place 
Courts and many commentators no doubt recognize that spatiality 
affects expressive activity. indeed, perhaps the most common, although 
generally implicit, criticism of the public forum doctrine is that it fails to 
facilitate speech by making adequate room for expression.242 But neither the 
mostly tacit recognition of place's importance to expression nor the critical 
analyses of the public forum concept arise from any concept of place 
different from or beyond res. Courts and commentators cannot seem to get 
past the idea that place is merely a form of property. To the extent that 
anthropology, architecture, and ecology); Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift, Introduction to THINKING 
SPACE 1, 2 (Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift eds., 2000) (introducing a collection of works addressing 
the importance of space in various disciplines). 
239. See CASEY, supra note 238, at ix-xi (portraying place as historically having been taken for 
granted, lying "deeply dormant in modem Western thinking"). 
240. See, e.g., Crang & Thrift, supra note 238, at 25 ("What we can say is that the 'where' is 
now joining the 'who,' the 'what,' and the 'why' of philosophy and social theory on roughly equal 
terms."). 
241. CASEY, supra note 238, at 286. 
242. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1536 (1998) (criticizing the public forum doctrine as "deeply inhospitable to 
speech in new or nontraditional forums"). 
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questions of "where" arise, they are analyzed as if "forums" and "zones" 
merely serve to mark neutral boundaries. This approach underestimates and 
devalues place, which is both more complex and more intimately associated 
with expression than the res concept allows. What follows is a more 
accurate conception of place and a more nuanced understanding of the 
intersection of speech and spatiality. This sketch, largely borrowed from 
disciplines that treat place as a central object of study, will help lawyers, 
legal scholars, judges, legislators, executive officials, and the public itself 
better appreciate what is at stake when governments regulate place generally, 
and when they use spatial tactics in particular. 
1. The Variability of Place .-The expressive place concept requires 
that we move beyond the simple, binary public-nonpublic categorization 
currently used under the public forum doctrine. It also requires that we cease 
viewing public areas as generally undifferentiated masses of space. There 
are at least twice as many types of places than the public forum doctrine 
currently recognizes. Each type of place raises discrete speech issues, 
touches upon different expressive traditions, and constitutes a distinct part of 
our expressive topography. 
Scholars in disciplines outside the law have concluded that place is a 
highly variable concept.243 It is, some have observed, "as complex as 
voice."244 To aid their study of place, anthropologists have identified a 
variety of different types of places. Among these are what are sometimes 
referred to in the literature as "contested" places, "inscribed" places, "non-
places," "embodied" places, and, finally, "tactical" places.245 To begin to 
move beyond res, it is helpful to conceive of the expressive topography in 
similar terms. 
"Contested" places are those that constitute the focus of some 
expressive dispute, such that being in this specific place is a critical aspect of 
the speaker's message. "Inscribed" places are primarily those with specific 
historical and symbolic significance, such as the National Mall and Central 
Park. History, including social and political conflict, is written in and on 
these places. A "non-place" is essentially undifferentiated space that has no 
opportunity to develop into a cultural and social place;246 in the First 
243. See Crang & Thrift, supra note 238, at 2 (referring to the concept of space as defined by 
various disciplines as a "Babel of conflicting interpretations"). 
244. Margaret C. Rodman, Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality, in THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 205. 
245. Many of these labels can be found in the description of places in Low & Lawrence-
Zufiiga, supra note 18, at 1-38. The list does not, of course, exhaust the types of expressive places. 
No discussion of expressive place would be complete, for example, without a treatment of cyber-
places. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995) 
(discussing democratizing features of speech in cyberspaces). The specific focus of this Article is 
on real space expressive concerns, most notably protest in public spaces. 
246. See lnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-83 (1992) (holding 
that airports, as a class of property, are nonpublic forums). See generally MARC AUGE, NON-
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Amendment context, airports are one example, since they are currently 
treated as nonpublic forums where speech is especially limited. Spatial 
tactics can sometimes create this kind of space. "Embodied" places raise 
issues of spatiality and privacy; they involve access to personal space, as in 
the abortion clinic context. "Tactical" places, as mentioned, are the 
constructed products of spatial tactics, as described in Part I. They are cages, 
zones, pens, and other places designed to control expressive activity. 
It is not necessary to develop these various space-types in greater detail 
here. The point is that expressive place is far more complex than the concept 
of place-as-res and the First Amendment doctrine of place suggest. With 
regard to spatial tactics, two things should be emphasized. First, as scholars 
in other disciplines have noted, spatial tactics produce a discrete type of 
place. The architectures of spatial tactics are not ordinary regulations of 
place; they are themselves places. Second, given its complexity and 
variability, "place" requires a far more specific and nuanced analysis than the 
doctrine of place currently provides. Even the brief description above 
indicates that each type of place possesses unique characteristics. Each 
place-type raises discrete concerns with respect to matters such as the quality 
of social interaction within the place, public access to it, and the historical 
practices, meanings, and expressive. memories associated with the place. 
Speech and spatiality intersect differently in each of these places. 
2. The Primacy of Place.-Ancient Greek philosophers were among the 
first to recognize the "firstness" of space and place. Aristotle observed in his 
Physics that "[t]he power of place will be remarkable."247 That sentiment has 
been echoed at various times, and by a variety of thinkers, through the ages. 
Thomas Hobbes said in Leviathan: "No man therefore can conceive any 
thing, but he must conceive it in some place."248 Phenomenologists have 
long recognized that place is a critical part of our "being-in-the-world."249 
"To be at all-to exist in any way-is to be somewhere, and to be 
somewhere is to be in some kind ofplace."250 
"Nothing we do is unplaced."251 This is, of course, as true of expression 
as anything else.252 This makes the relative indifference to the concept of 
PLACES: INTRODUCTION TO AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF SUPERMODERNITY ( 1995) (defining non-places 
as spaces formed in relationship to certain ends that, unlike anthropological places, are not 
essentially social). 
247. CASEY, supra note 238, at ix (emphasis omitted). 
248. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Il-12 (Ernest Rhys ed., The Temple Press Letchworth 
1940)(1651). 
249. HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER'S BEING 
AND TIME, DIVISION I (7th ed. 1997). 
250. CASEY, supra note 238, at ix. 
251. ld. 
252. Even expression that takes place in cyber-places, which seem to have no connection to 
place as it is traditionally understood, takes place somewhere. ld. at xii-xvi ("Granting that the 
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place in constitutional jurisprudence and literature all the more remarkable. 
Place is a critical, if not the critical, foundation for all expressive rights. 
Along with the basic abilities to speak, read, and hear, it makes these rights 
possible. The Court has on occasion at least hinted at this fact. lt has said 
that expressive freedom requires a robust marketplace ofideas.253 Moreover, 
as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, expression requires adequate 
"breathing space" for its effective exercise. 254 And debate can hardly be 
"wide open"255 without adequate physical places set aside for the airing of 
positions and arguments in public discourse. But these are simple metaphors, 
not commitments to making physical space for speech. The doctrine of 
place, and the res concept itself, belie any professed understanding that 
speech can thrive only when given adequate room or space. 
Spatial adequacy is critical, particularly when considering the use and 
effects of spatial tactics. The idea of spatial "primacy" does not suggest 
merely an increase in total, or net, expressive surface area. It requires, rather, 
a careful consideration of the specific properties and characteristics of places, 
whatever the forum, that are made available to speakers. This is so because 
the character of place substantially affects the experience of expression. An 
enclosed cage, a parking lot, some space at the bottom of a stairwell, and a 
small gazebo are all places where expressive activity can occur, to be sure, 
but they are surely not encouraging or facilitative places. The particular 
geometries and architectures of place have a substantial and profound impact 
on the substance of expressive rights. This is just one of the ways in which 
speech and spatiality are intimately related. 
Sociologists have long recognized this fundamental principle of 
spatiality: The specific qualities of a place condition the possibilities of 
social interaction within that place.256 Georg Simmel, in his seminal article 
The Sociology of Space, carefully examined how spatial conditions affect 
social interaction.257 Especially in the past decade or so, many architects, 
geographers, and anthropologists have reached the same insight with respect 
to the influence of spatial characteristics on such things as the quality of 
literal locus of the technologically engaged person is a matter of comparative indifference, this 
locus is still not nowhere."). 
253. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) (stating that the "government 
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas"). 
254. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
255. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1963). 
256. See, e.g., HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 73 (Donald Nicholson-Smith 
trans., Blackwell Publishing 1991) (1974); YI-FU TuAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
EXPERIENCE 101-17 (1977); David E. Sopher, Place and Location: Notes on the Spatial Patterning 
of Culture, 53 Soc. Scl. Q. 321-37 (1972). 
257. See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Space, reprinted in SIMMEL ON CULTURE: SELECTED 
WRITINGS 137 (David Frisby & Mike Featherstone eds., 1997). For a general discussion of 
Simmel's sociological examination of space, see John Allen, On Georg Simmel.· Proximity, 
Distance and Movement, in THINKING SPACE, supra note 238, at 54, 54-55. 
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urban living, the nature of local culture, even citizens' feelings with regard to 
nationality.258 
We may add to this list of things affected by spatial characteristics the 
enjoyment of expressive rights, which are crucial to social interaction in our 
society. The principle of spatial primacy indicates that the exercise of these 
rights depends not only upon some minimal provision of space, but 
specifically on places that facilitate communication and citizen interaction. 
The architecture of a place is thus critical to an examination of the scope of 
expressive rights afforded by that place. 
3. The Production of Place.-Merely recogmzmg these first two 
features of space-variability and primacy-should lead courts to ask more 
appropriate questions with regard to tactical places: How, specifically, do 
these places relate to expression? How are they created? By whom? For 
what purpose? What are their characteristics, their architectural features? 
How do these features affect social interaction and communication inside and 
outside these places? Who or what is most affected by tactical places? 
What, if anything, do they symbolize or communicate to those inside and 
those outside their boundaries? 
In treating place as an undifferentiated mass, place-as-res misses yet 
another critical link between speech and spatiality. Scholars in other 
disciplines have long recognized that the process whereby places take 
shape-who is responsible for their design, who is being burdened, at what 
point in time, and why-is a matter of critical importance in understanding 
the significance of place.259 Theorists and social scientists have thus made 
the "production" of place a subject of independent study.26° Critical human 
geography, a branch of the geographic discipline informed by Marxism, 
feminism, and poststructuralism, places special emphasis on the idea that 
places are not given but made. 261 Two basic principles follow from this 
theoretical perspective. First, it is through the process of social production 
that the raw material of undifferentiated space becomes place.262 Second, at 
least according to critical theorists, places are generally created by some 
258. See generally Low & Lawrence-ZUiiiga, supra note 18, at 1-37 (surveying the approaches 
of anthropology, environmental psychology, sociology, architecture, geography, and urban planning 
to place). 
259. For a critical acconnt of this process, see LEFEBVRE, supra note 256, at II ("Later on I 
shall demonstrate the active-the operational or instrumental-role of space, as knowledge and 
action, in the existing mode of production."). 
260. See, e.g., id. 
261. See TiM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 26--29 (2004) (describing the work 
of critical geographers). 
262. See TuAN, supra note 256, at 6 ("What begins as undifferentiated space becomes plaee as 
we get to know it better and endow it with value."). 
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class of people with more power than others.263 These power-elites decide 
what is or is not appropriate within any particular place.264 
Place-as-res downplays this process, treating "forum" as a mere label 
for property that exists rather than a place that is continually in process. A 
"public forum" is not merely a historical artifact defined by its original 
function and the state's subsequent use of the property. Forums, whether 
they are streets or parks or airports, are judicial, social, and governmental 
constructs. Res does not capture the dynamic process of spatial production, 
the manner in which people connect to places, or are prevented from doing 
so. For example, the primary purpose of a street, as the Court has 
emphasized,265 is to facilitate travel or movement. As raw material, asphalt 
and stone, a street is seemingly unrelated to expression. But the street 
becomes a "forum" for expressive activity when courts, government officials, 
and citizens declare its existence, regulate it, and actively utilize it, 
respectively. "Place," in other words, is actively produced by the interaction, 
combination, and collision of laws, rules, norms of behavior, and social 
practices. 266 
Once again, although we do not tend to conceptualize them as such, 
speech zones, cages, and pens are places. They too are constructed or 
produced. These mini-forums are carved from preexisting forums like 
streets, ostensibly to make room for speech or to direct it to locales that 
officials consider more appropriate. The production of such tactical places 
results in this simple fact: People speak here, or they do not speak at all. 
What speakers say, and how they say it, will depend upon the specific 
characteristics of these places, which are in tum a function of the nature of 
the spatial tactics used. Ultimately, whether zoned or partitioned areas 
become expressive places, or remain undifferentiated and inert spaces, 
depends on a number of factors: the properties of the area set aside for 
speech; the restrictions on activities within; and the interactions users have 
with the place itself and with those outside its boundaries. 
As critical geographers surmise, tactical places, like most others, are 
constructed primarily by those who possess power to contain and control 
those who do not.267 Whether it is a mailbox, a military base, a sidewalk, or 
263. For an influential account of the construction of space, see generally LEFEBVRE, supra 
note 256. 
264. See CRESSWELL, supra note 261, at 12 ("Place, at a basic level, is space invested with 
meaning in the context of power."). 
265. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 750 (1965) (declaring that '"(m]unicipal 
authorities ... have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of 
people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated"' (quoting Schneider v. 
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939))). 
266. See MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 108 (Steven F. Rendall 
trans., 1984) (emphasizing the manner in which human activity makes places). 
267. See. e.g., NICHOLAS L. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER, at 
xiii (1994) (positing judges and lawmakers as overlooked framers of space); MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 236 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1977) (highlighting the 
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a buffer zone, "place," properly understood, is a manifestation of this power 
dynamic. This is not difficult to see insofar as tactical places are concerned. 
Planning boards, campus officials, lawmakers, and law enforcement officials 
are the architects of tactical places. The contours of these places suit their 
needs. Given the power granted to these officials as trustees and proprietors 
of public areas, we should be far more concerned with understanding who or 
what is being placed in tactical places. The mere fact that protesters, social 
agitators, and others who challenge the status quo are disparately confined to 
these spaces does not necessarily demonstrate a violation of expressive 
rights. But the identity of those confined does support the notion that place 
manifests power and that this power can be used to muffle or silence certain 
points of view. And that, of course, does implicate serious First Amendment 
concerns. In any event, it should be evident that using spatial tactics entails 
more than the mere partitioning of some res or parcel of property. It is an 
exercise of the power, granted doctrinally to the state as trustee and 
proprietor of public space, to displace political dissent and speech that is 
likely to offend viewers and listeners. 
Taking into account place's primacy, the state's power to influence the 
production of tactical and other places can lead to a substantial impact on 
expressive and associative rights. As noted, the character of a place strongly 
influences social interaction and, by extension, the enjoyment of expressive 
rights within. The process of social construction "defines the experience of 
space through which 'peoples' social exchanges, memories, images and daily 
use of the material setting' transform it and give it meaning."268 This 
conception of place as a social construct is, in contrast to place-as-res, no 
empty vessel or mere backdrop. Here place is viewed as a repository and 
manifestation of social exchange, memories, images, uses, and meaning. 
Thus, the power to define which public areas are open to expression, and just 
how open they will be, is ultimately the power to affect not only expression, 
but a great deal more than that as well. 269 
We must, as one scholar said, move "away from a sense of space as a 
practico-inert container of action towards space as a socially produced set of 
manifolds."270 The res concept does not permit this sort of conceptual 
advancement. As a result, we are led to believe that the state's control of the 
spatial terms of expression is generally nothing more than the neutral 
partitioning of public properties. By viewing place as a construct, we can 
reconnect speech and spatiality on yet another fundamental level. We can, 
more specifically, better appreciate and understand the implications of the 
prison as the exemplar of containing and controlling space); EDWARD SOJA, POSTMODERN 
GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN SOCIAL CRJTICAL THEORY (1989). 
268. Low & Lawrence-Zlliiiga, supra note 18, at 20 (quoting SETHA M. Low, ON THE PLAZA: 
THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE AND CULTURE 128 (2000)). 
269. See Rodman, supra note 244, at 203 ("[P]laces are socially constructed by the people who 
live in them and know them; they are 'politicized, culturally relative, historically specific.'"). 
270. Crang & Thrift, supra note 238, at 2. 
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tactical places we see all around us. Place is not merely a forum where 
expression occurs; it is a manifestation or symbol of the speech that occurs 
within. All places, including tactical ones, do more than contain bodies; they 
hold and represent memories, emotions, and meanings. Further, as the next 
section demonstrates, they communicate. A res, of course, does not do any 
of these things. 
4. The Dynamism of Place.-A final important insight from the spatial 
tum in disciplines like geography, philosophy, and anthropology is that place 
is not, as place-as-res indicates, inert and non-communicative. Place is 
dynamic; it is itself an event. More than this, places can themselves actually 
"express" or "communicate" something about the specific activities that they 
permit, regulate, or suppress. As will become apparent, this is a critical 
recognition in terms of the analysis of tactical places. 
Jacques Derrida opined "that a building is more of a happening than a 
thing."271 Derrida's insight applies to places more generally. A place "is a 
happening not just in the sense of the event of construction-significant and 
necessary as this is-but in that, even as already constructed, it continues to 
occur, to be 'the imminence of that which happens now. "'272 Put another 
way, as Derrida and others have observed,273 place gives or makes room for 
things to occur. Architecture, then, is "a mode of spacing that makes a place 
for the event."274 
Here place's power resides not so much in its past-the events of its 
production-as in its possibilities-the events that may take place there in 
the future. Streets, sidewalks, and parks, for example, all make some room 
for expressive events. But spatial tactics diminish the possibilities for 
expressive happenings in these forums. As they partition, confine, and 
segregate, spatial tactics render place inert, a non-happening, a non-event. 
Tactical places like the Boston speech cage described in Part I can transform 
public places from hopeful possibilities into more-or-less aborted events. 
Places themselves are expressive happenings. As places happen, as they 
are socially produced, speech is conveyed, amplified, muted, suppressed, 
recalled, and altered. As it exists, a place expresses something. As it 
becomes regulated, it may express something else. As one scholar has 
suggested, places are "'multivocal'; they bespeak people's practices, their 
history, their conflicts, their accomplishments."275 As another scholar, an 
271. CASEY, supra note 238, at 313. 
272. Id (quoting Jacques Derrida, Point de Folie-Maintenant L 'Architecture, translated in 
Kate Linker, AA FILES, Summer 1986, at 65, § 3). 
273. See, e.g., AUGE, supra note 246, at 43 ("The place eommon to the ethnologist and its 
indigenous inhabitants is in one sense (the sense of the Latin word invenire) an invention: it has 
been discovered by those who claim it as their own."). 
274. CASEY, supra note 238, at 313. 
275. Rodman, supra note 244, at 214 (emphasis added). As one anthropologist suggested: "In 
describing 'political events,' sites such as a courtroom, a Red Square, Whitehall, the White House 
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anthropologist, observed: "[T]here is a condensation of values in particular 
sites, and transactions that constitute the totality of social life may be 
spatially mapped with specific sites expressing relatively durable structured 
interests and related values."276 Spatial dynamism conveys the "idea, well 
established in geography, that places produce meaning and that meaning can 
be grounded in place."277 Places, in other words, do not merely contain 
speech and conduct-they communicate something about these things. It is 
imperative that we ask what these places are communicating-with respect 
to power, with respect to the speech and the speakers regulated in places, and 
with respect to our commitment to public expression generally. 
Place-as-res cannot encompass the complexities of expressive place-
its variability, primacy, production, or dynamism. It cannot do so, first and 
foremost, because place-as-res artificially separates speech and spatiality. As 
the foregoing discussion demonstrates, speech and spatiality are intimately 
associated; they intersect in various and complex ways. The state's power to 
manage, control, and produce place substantially affects the speaker's ability 
to convey her message. These insights apply to expressive place in general. 
But they have special salience when considering tactical places which, as the 
next section demonstrates, are uniquely troubling regulations of expressive 
activity given their constructive and dynamic qualities. 
B. Spatial Tactics As a "Benthamite Physics of Power" 
Thus far, this Article has sought to distance place from res by 
suggesting that place is distinctly different from mere property. It is, among 
other things, variable, primary, constructed, and dynamic. This conception 
casts regulation of the "where" of expression in a new light. It suggests a 
need to look more closely at what spatial tactics accomplish, on whose 
behalf, at whose expense, and with what effect on public expressive activity. 
The idea that space can be used to control and discipline behavior is not, 
of course, unique to the speech context. Spatiality has always been an 
attractive organizing principle. Indeed, for as long as there have been 
sovereign authorities, or any hierarchy of authority for that matter, place has 
been used to control populations.278 Officials have recognized the power of 
place to distribute things like knowledge, wealth, access, and power. 
As it happens, spatial tactics have a rich historical and intellectual 
pedigree. Michel Foucault, who laced many of his works with important 
can be interpreted as giving an emotional effect, comparable to the power of rhetoric, to the voice of 
authority." Hilda Kuper, The Language of Sites in the Politics of Space, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 258. 
276. Hilda Kuper, The Language of Sites in the Politics of Space, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE, supra note 18, at 258. 
277. Rodman, supra note 244, at 207. 
278. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 195 (describing a seventeenth-century order that relied 
upon "strict spatial partitioning" to combat the plague). 
626 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:581 
insights about the power of place, noted a critical distinction between 
architecture that was built to be seen and that which was built "to permit an 
internal, articulated and detailed control."279 Foucault observed, for instance, 
that those in power used place tactically to arrange populations: officials used 
place to separate ailing communities from healthy ones, the sane from the 
insane, and men of higher ranks from those oflower ranks.280 
Foucault, perhaps more than any other modern thinker, recognized the 
ubiquity of spatial tactics. He observed these at work in, among other places, 
military camps, schools (which he referred to as "pedagogical machines"), 
prisons, factories, and asylums.281 In the course of examining these and other 
tactical "architectures," Foucault noted the degree of social control made 
possible by these institutions' spatial character. He conceptualized the 
architecture of these places as "a political 'technology' for working out the 
concerns of government-that is, control and power over individuals-
through the spatial 'canalization' of everyday life."282 
Foucault recognized that the power of place, from the state's 
perspective, lay in its ability to segregate, discipline, surveil, and control that 
which threatened the status quo.283 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault's 
examination of the history of the modern prison, he theorized that the state's 
choice of architecture was intended to accomplish precisely these things. 284 
The purpose of prisons was the creation of a "docile body" through 
"enclosure and the organization of individuals in space."285 This docility was 
accomplished, Foucault observed, principally through the application of 
spatial arrangements and particular architectural features to the human 
body.zs6 
Foucault drew heavily upon Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as a 
paradigmatic example of the tactical use of place.287 The Panopticon was 
279. /d. at 172. 
280. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC (1976); FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 
145-47 (using as an example the Jesuit college model, itself based on the Roman legion, to show 
how the place one occupies in a classification scheme defines rank); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS 
AND CMLIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 3-13 (Richard Howard trans., 
Vintage Books 1988) (1965) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION] (discussing the 
use of special houses to isolate lepers and the use of ships to distance the insane). 
281. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 171-74 (discussing the spatial tactics of military 
camps, schools, hospitals, and factories). 
282. Low & Lawrence-ZUfi.iga, supra note 18, at 30 (quoting FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 
198). 
283. See FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 170-74 (suggesting that the architectural design of 
buildings by those in power is motivated by a need for surveillance). 
284. See id. at 249-50 (describing how architects were directed to specifically design prisons to 
further the goals of discipline and economy). 
285. Denise L. Lawrence & Setha M. Low, The Built Environment and Spatial Form, 19 ANN. 
REv. ANTHRO. 453, 485 (1990) (discussing Foucault's theory of architecture as a mechanism of 
control). 
286. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 143. 
287. /d. at 200. 
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perhaps the ultimate disciplinary architecture. Its unique architectural feature 
consisted of an arrangement of cell-like spaces, each of which could be seen 
only by a supervising authority, without the knowledge of the person being 
observed.288 Foucault referred to the Panopticon as a "cruel, ingenious 
cage."289 He specifically noted the tactical feature of individual cells: "They 
are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, 
perfectly individualized and constantly visible."290 The Panopticon, Foucault 
said, represented "an architectural mechanism of control in its ideal form."291 
It was designed and built 
to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control-to render 
visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture 
that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, 
to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right 
to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them.292 
Foucault noted that this tactic, or at least something like it, ultimately came 
to serve a variety of disciplinary ends, among them the ready surveillance 
and control of inmates, patients, and schoolchildren. 293 
As the Panopticon exemplifies, spatial tactics like cages, pens, and 
zones represent a precise and effective form of discipline and control. 
Foucault noted the "progressive objectification and the ever more subtle 
partitioning of individual behaviour," the "innumerable petty mechanisms" 
of control and surveillance built into these sorts of architectures. 294 He also 
provided the significant insight, insofar as the discussion of modem spatial 
tactics is concerned, that these tactics operate with a subtlety that obscures 
their substantial influence on behavior. Foucault's remarks might well be 
applied to many of the tactics discussed in Part 1: "The disciplinary 
institutions secreted a machinery of control that functioned like a microscope 
of conduct; the fine, analytical divisions that they created formed around men 
an apparatus of observation, recording and training."295 Foucault 
emphasized that this power was exercised not by any specific person or 
institution, but by "a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, 
gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in 
which individuals are caught up."296 Significantly, no force or violence was 
necessary; control was exercised through "the laws of optics and mechanics, 
288. Id. at 200-02. 
289. Id. at 205. 
290. ld. at 200. 
291. Low & Lawrence-Zuiiiga, supra note 18, at 30. 
292. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 172 (emphasis added). 
293. ld. at 200-01. 
294. !d. at 173. 
295. Id. (emphasis added). 
296. Id. at 202. 
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according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, [and] degrees."297 
It was exercised, in other words, spatially. 
Through this geometric precision, this exercise of raw power through 
place, officials discovered the effective technique of what Foucault referred 
to as "binary division and branding," by which he meant a mode of 
separating populations-the mad from the sane; the dangerous from the 
harmless; the normal from the abnormal. 298 In separating populations in this 
fashion, place communicated something about potential dangers or threats to 
the community. In terms of the principle of spatial dynamism discussed in 
the previous section, place expressed something about the status of those 
within to those who remained on the outside. It symbolized status, power, 
knowledge, and danger. 
In addition, spatiality has been used throughout history "to make 
differences in power perfectly recognizable."299 In contexts in which spatial 
tactics have been considered and applied, a common theme is the role spatial 
relations play in the maintenance of power of one group over another-
guard-prisoner; schoolmaster-principal; factory boss-worker; health care 
worker-patient; resident-outsider; ruler-ruled.300 The "preferred spatial 
modalities" represented by the architectures of these constructed places are 
thus "expressions of specific distributions of power."301 These "calculated 
distributions" of space and place are preferred by those in power because of 
what they provide: order, control, surveillance, separation, and branding.302 
Tactical places are highly pragmatic architectures insofar as government 
officials are concerned. As Foucault noted, the power of place has been used 
to serve government's first need: to maintain order.303 In fact, Foucault 
specifically addressed the central issue of this Article when he observed that 
297. !d. at 177. 
298. !d. at 199; see id. at 20 I ("Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the 
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power."). 
299. Rabinow, supra note 20, at 353, 357-58. Modem cultural geographers and 
anthropologists have made the same point in their studies of spatial tactics in urban and suburban 
geography. They have drawn on Foucault's insights in studying such phenomena as gated 
communities, planned towns, and tourist villages. See, e.g., Low, supra note 20, at 387 (describing 
recent research on spatial tactics). 
300. See, e.g., Low, supra note 20, at 387 (suggesting that gated communities reinforce class 
relations); Rabinow, supra note 20, at 353 (theorizing that urban planning supports "military 
control" and helps to "establish a comprehensive order"). 
301. CASEY, supra note 238, at 298. 
302. FOUCAULT,supra note 267, at 219. 
303. Importantly, Foucault stated, 
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are 
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all 
events are recorded, ... in which power is exercised without division, according to a 
continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located ... -all 
this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. 
!d. at 197. 
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through spatiality "an exact geometry" could be used by the state specifically 
to combat disorder and dissent.304 This, Foucault noted, is an especially 
significant power for a government faced with mass phenomena like protests 
and demonstrations.305 He observed: "Whenever one is dealing with a 
multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour 
must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used."306 Place, Foucault 
observed, could be ordered to "neutralize the effects of counter-power," such 
things as "agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions."307 Put 
rather bluntly, spatial tactics render the bodies of agitators "docile" through 
"enclosure and the organization of individuals in space."308 
For Foucault, however, power was not inherent in architecture. Rather, 
he theorized that place has been an element of specific "political strategies" 
at certain points in history. 309 IfF oucault is correct, then we would expect to 
see a rise in spatial tactics as social and political conditions threaten the 
status quo. The tactical places described in Part I fit this theory quite well. 
So, too, does other evidence of this responsive or defensive use of spatial 
tactics. For example, recent gated residential developments are a private 
response to, among other things, increased crime and overcrowding. Like 
spatial tactics generally, these places are constructs designed to further 
interests in power, control, and separation. There is meaning in these 
architectures. They are dynamic constructs. Indeed, as one anthropologist 
suggested, "adding walls, gates, and guards produces a landscape that 
encodes class relations and residential (race/class/ethnic/gender) segregation 
more permanently in the built environment."310 Others in the same field have 
noted the rise of the "fortress city" in places like Los Angeles, where 
architecture is utilized "as a strategy for controlling and patrolling the urban 
poor that is made up of predominantly ethnic-Latino and Black-
minorities."311 These architectures, as well, "facilitate avoidance, separation, 
and surveillance."312 
Foucault's observations about place provide further support for 
conceptualizing place not as mere res, but as an expressive manifestation of 
power. Spatial tactics, in particular, are purposeful political technologies, 
304. !d. at 174. 
305. !d. at 219 ("[Discipline] must also master all the forces that are formed from the very 
constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring 
from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, 
spontaneous organizations, coalitions-anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions."). 
306. !d. at 205. 
307. Id. at 219; see id. ("That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears 
up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in 
unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions."). 
308. Low & Lawrence-ZUiiiga, supra note 18, at 30. 
309. Low, supra note 20, at 355. 
310. Id. at387. 
311. !d. at 389. 
312. Id. at391. 
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designed and utilized in response to pressing social and political 
circumstances. As Foucault observed, place acts as "a functional mechanism 
that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, 
more effective, a design of subtle coercion."313 But the implications of 
spatial tactics are far graver than this. They extend beyond rather discrete 
places of power, like prisons and schools. Spatial tactics condition our most 
public social places, some of the last remaining public areas in which we 
encounter one another spontaneously and involuntarily. As they continue to 
multiply, spatial tactics will recast the expressive topography. A 
"Benthamite physics of power" is being utilized to create what Foucault 
called the "disciplinary society."314 Part IV addresses what approach courts 
should take in light ofthis fuller appreciation of the power place has to affect 
and control public discourse. 
IV. Judicial Review of Spatial Tactics 
This Part applies Part III's interdisciplinary insights regarding place to 
generate proposals for judicial review of the spatial tactics described in Part 
I. Spatial tactics currently enjoy the presumption of neutrality that applies to 
place in general, and to other run mine spatial regulations. Accordingly, a 
substantial portion of this Part is devoted to rebutting the notion that spatial 
tactics are neutral regulations of the place where expression may occur. First 
Amendment doctrine makes it very difficult to demonstrate purposeful 
content discrimination. Thus, it may not be possible to demonstrate in any 
particular case that the state has targeted a specific point of view. But this 
does not mean that courts should continue to view spatial tactics as unrelated 
to content. The perspective of place set forth in Part III reveals that tactical 
places may properly be described as "content-correlated."315 Given this 
connection between speech and spatiality, there is sufficient justification for 
applying what might be called "spatial skepticism" to the tactical use of 
place. The state should be forced to justify the use of spatial tactics by 
actually demonstrating the substantial interests it asserts. In addition, courts 
should carefully review the lines the state has drawn, the "tailoring" of 
tactical places, and confirm that the lines restrict no more speech than 
necessary to serve the state's substantial interests.316 Finally, given place's 
primacy and dynamism, courts should be highly skeptical of arguments that 
messages displaced or cut off by spatial tactics can simply be expressed 
313. Id 
314. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 209. 
315. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
316. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that a 
restriction based on content survives only upon a showing of necessity to serve a compelling 
governmental interest combined with the least restrictive narrow tailoring). 
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elsewhere. Whether alternative places are truly adequate should be a serious 
part of the constitutional inquiry. 
This proposal differs from the usual argument that time, place, and 
manner regulations should generally be subject to greater scrutiny. First, it 
applies only to spatial regulations. This is not to say that time and manner 
cannot be manipulated; but the Article has demonstrated that place, in 
particular tactical place, merits special consideration. Second, rather than 
simply beginning from the mistaken premise of res or property, we now 
know why place, and spatial tactics, are uniquely problematic. This will 
inform the analysis of governmental neutrality, spatial tailoring, and the 
purported existence of adequate alternative places for speech. 
This Part concludes by considering the most likely objection to singling 
out spatial tactics for special judicial attention: In an age when access to a 
modem is all one needs to blog, vent, and otherwise express an opinion on 
virtually any topic, why should courts spend energy and capital scrutinizing 
real, physical places? There will undoubtedly be those who view concern 
over access to streets, sidewalks, and parks as outdated. This Part, however, 
offers several reasons why real public places remain critical to expressive 
and associative freedoms. 
A. Place and Neutrality 
The presumption that place is a resource partitioned without regard to 
expressive content stems from the conception of place-as-res. This 
misconception in tum causes courts to ignore how place is being utilized, by 
whom, for what purposes, and with what effect on expressive and associative 
rights. As Part Ill emphasized, spatial tactics do more than determine the 
place where expression may occur. The government uses spatial tactics to 
separate speakers from listeners, to subject speech to surveillance, and to 
immobilize expression. Tactical places brand, even stigmatize, the speech, 
and the speakers, within. Careful examination of these places reveals that 
neither the constructive process, nor the tactical places themselves, are as 
neutral as courts presume. 
1. The "Calculated Distributions" of Spatial Tactics.-The 
constitutional doctrine of place gives "place" a neutral veneer. A "forum" is 
simply a locale where speech does or does not occur, depending upon the 
property's objective characteristics and the state's objectively manifested 
intent. "Time, place, and manner" regulations serve normatively neutral 
interests like the maintenance of order, tranquility, and aesthetics. But as 
Part Ill emphasized, scholars in many other disciplines have long questioned 
the presumptive neutrality of place.317 Anthropologists, for example, have 
observed: "The assumed neutrality of [place] conceals its role in maintaining 
317. See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text. 
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the social system, inculcating particular ideologies and scripted 
narratives."318 
The legal discipline generally does not grasp this important insight. It is 
wholly missing from the constitutional doctrine of place. When courts see 
cages and zones, indeed when they see any place, they do not see ideologies, 
narratives, or messages. They see only legal res-public property managed 
and partitioned by governmental trustees and proprietors. But in critical 
terms, zones, cages, pens, and other tactical places are not brute facts. These 
places are not given. As the concept of expressive place emphasizes, they 
are made. 
Spatial tactics do not merely distribute legal property; they allocate 
power, wealth, access, and knowledge. They are, indeed, an aspect of the 
"disciplinary society" Foucault lamented.319 Our most basic geography, 
public and private, is a manifestation of this. Large, open spaces are 
becoming less prevalent in urban and suburban areas. Partly because space is 
so scarce, every space is assigned a specific, approved use. We are routinely 
told where to sit, stand, run, smoke, walk, drive, drink, play, and, of course, 
speak. In addition to public regulations, private forces also routinely dictate 
which places we can and cannot enter, which are off limits to those without 
special permission to be there, and what we can do once we are in place. If 
you do not have a first class ticket, you cannot sit in this place. If you do not 
have a pass or membership, you are not privileged to enter this club or 
community. These kinds of regulations and restrictions do not raise 
constitutional concerns. Still, few would suggest that they are neutral. They 
contribute to, and result in, expectations with regard to who and what 
"belongs" where. Place, then, is always doing more than merely fashioning a 
"neutral" system of access, behavior, or activity. 
This insight applies with equal force to tactical places. Tactical places 
are created for the same reason Foucault ascribed to architectures like 
asylums, schools, and prisons-to discipline and control that which is 
captured within. 320 Spatial tactics are designed to control expression. They 
arise wherever offensive speech threatens the repose of listeners, or the 
interests of government. Recent examples of this reactive use of spatial 
tactics abound. Thus, just after protesters recently began to show up at 
funerals to protest the Iraq War, legislators acted to impose speech zones.321 
After a protester began handing out literature facilitating challenges to court 
318. Low & Lawrence-Zllfiiga, supra note 18, at 30; see also Patricia Yaeger, Introduction to 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY I, 1-39 (Patricia Yaeger ed., 1996) (explaining that dominant 
discourses regarding space discount its social effects and exploring new "cultural geography" 
approaches to space that illustrate its political and social influence). 
319. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 209. 
320. See id. at 209. 
321. See supra note I 0. 
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citations, court officials banned expression within 100 feet of the 
courthouse.322 The pattern is typical. 
One cannot, of course, leap directly from timing to the conclusion that 
tactical places target specific points of view such that a more skeptical 
judicial scrutiny is appropriate. As mentioned, it is very difficult to 
demonstrate content targeting in general. 323 But courts ought to be aware of 
this timing and recognize the reactive use of spatial tactics where it occurs. 
More specifically, three aspects of tactical place undermine the neutrality 
presumption: the architects of tactical places, the design elements of these 
architectures, and the impact these places have on certain kinds of 
expression. 
It is important to recognize, as Foucault did/24 that spatial tactics are 
historically contingent. We should thus not be surprised at the recent use of 
spatial tactics on the streets, at universities and abortion clinics, and in other 
places where agitation is likely to occur. These tactics are targeted responses 
to some of the most wrenching and divisive social and political issues of our 
time, subjects like war, racism, and abortion. As Foucault theorized, spatial 
tactics are political technologies used by government to counter mass 
agitations, revolts, and other threats to the status quo.325 In other words, 
tactical places arc "calculated distributions" of place.326 Those who use 
spatial tactics in times of turmoil-the law enforcement and other officials 
who are doing the calculating-are inherently biased against disruptive 
expression. As discussed below, it may be appropriate to presume that city 
planners, who design zoning schemes, are not biased as to any particular use 
of property.327 But this presumption does not apply to government officials 
seeking to defuse tense expressive environments, particularly where the 
tension relates specifically to governmental policies. 
The architectural design elements of tactical places also undermine 
these places' presumptive neutrality. Given their generally restrictive 
characteristics and out-of-the-way locations,328 it is difficult to see these 
spaces as anything other than manifestations of a certain discomfort with and 
bias against demonstrations, protests, and other agitations. The degree of 
displacement is often itself troubling. Protesters may end up thousands of 
feet from their intended audiences. For example, a recent ordinance banning 
322. See supra note 161. 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. 
324. See FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 218 ("The formation of the disciplinary society is 
connected with a number of broad historical processes--economic, juridico-political, and, lastly, 
scientific-of which it forms part."). 
325. /d. at 141-49,215-16, 219. 
326. /d. at 219. 
327. See infra notes 375-382. 
328. See, e.g., Low, supra note 20, at 387 ("[A]dding walls, gates, and guards produces a 
landscape that encodes class relations and residential (race/class/ethnic/gender) segregation more 
permanently in the built environment." (citation omitted)). 
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protests within five thousand feet of any funeral service reportedly forced 
protesters to demonstrate at the county sanitation department on the edge of 
town.329 As well, there are normative judgments lurking in the look and feel 
of these new architectures. The Boston speech cage is the clearest example. 
The jersey barriers, razor wire, mesh, and other design elements of the DZ's 
architecture were designed with a particular type of expression in mind. 
These features created a place in which it was apparent that little, if any, 
dissent or agitation was supposed to occur. The DZ's architecture was 
intentional; it anticipated and countered disruption at each specific tum, right 
down to the application of a double-mesh barrier that inhibited convention-
goers' ability to see the protesters.330 Sensing that little or no social or 
expressive activity was possible in this space, no one entered it. 331 In the 
end, then, the DZ was like the Panopticon: "an exemplary institution of state 
power."332 It did not merely regulate dissent; it actually suppressed it. 
Although their architectures are less dramatic, other spatial tactics raise 
similar concerns. As a geme, bubbles, pens, buffers, and zones do more than 
inconvenience speakers by displacing them and their messages. Given the 
primacy of place to expression, these calculated distributions ultimately 
affect whether speech will reach its intended audience at all or will instead be 
hidden, obscured, and avoided. A "free speech zone" that is the size of a 
parking space or gazebo, and is located where few if any listeners will pass, 
is specifically designed to minimize communication and interaction. 
Spatial tactics are not entirely neutral with regard to speakers, or the 
forms of speech protesters, demonstrators, and other "agitators" typically rely 
upon. They routinely distort the vocality of place. They disparately, if not 
exclusively, affect voices of agitation, dissent, and disruption. They are, 
again, designed with these sorts of voices in mind. Demonstrations and other 
expressive agitations are attacks on the status quo. Abortion and political 
protests, even certain strains of hftteful speech, are expressive "revolts" 
against current policies, circumstances, or conditions. Notably, disruption is 
a significant aspect of the message these speakers seek to convey.333 That 
message is suppressed entirely when demonstrators, protesters, and other 
social agitators are herded into pens, cages, gazebos, and speech zones. In 
these places, protests and demonstrations become little more than staged 
events, bland and neutered imitations of past social and political movements. 
They are capitulations to order and the status quo, rather than challenges to 
these things. 
329. Tenn. County Bars Protests Near Funerals, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Oct. 27, 2005, 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=J5985. 
330. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
332. CASEY, supra note 238, at 309 (referring to the Panopticon as a space that is "stringently 
controlled and internally transparent"). 
333. I am indebted to Brian Tamanaha for making this particular point in our discussions 
regarding protest activity in the 1960s. 
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Some examples help to highlight the content correlation of spatial 
tactics. Suppose that if a speaker wishes to support the President, she may 
stand near him, where she can be seen and heard. 334 This is, perhaps, 
outright viewpoint discrimination. Less overtly or obviously, suppose that if, 
however, she wishes to dissent with respect to certain administration policies, 
she must do so at a baseball field a substantial distance from the event. 335 If a 
speaker wishes to participate in a protest, she must stand within the provided 
pens or barricades, where authorities and passers-by can see who is involved, 
who is dissenting, and who is responsible for any disruption or 
inconvenience.336 If a speaker wants to protest with others at a national party 
convention, she must commit to a cage provided for that purpose. 337 If you 
wished to protest animal cruelty at the Cow Palace before 2004, you had to 
stand within one of the 10-foot-by-20-foot "free speech" zones provided.338 
But if you were on the grounds for any purpose other than conducting a 
"demonstration," then according to the institution's "free speech policy," you 
were free to make your point wherever you chose. 339 In each instance, where 
you are placed depends in substantial part on what you have to say. 
Location depends, as well, on how you intend to convey your message. 
Spatial tactics are designed to deal with specific modes of communication. 
Mass agitations and other expressions that rely upon some combination of 
speech and conduct are most likely to be affected by cages, pens, and other 
tactical containers. There is no reason to doubt the wisdom of Professor 
Kalven's observation that courts are inherently biased against what he called 
"speech plus," which includes things like protests, demonstrations, marches, 
and parades. 340 There is no reason to believe that local officials are not 
similarly disposed toward these sorts of expressive "nuisances." Those 
charged with maintaining order generally view negatively the distractions 
and logistical problems associated with mass agitations and other forms of 
protest.341 The fact that this is a logical, common, and even understandable 
reaction to disruptive speech is all the more reason to carefully scrutinize the 
decisions of those in charge of designing tactical places. 
334. See Bovard, supra note 42 (discussing the Bush administration's "quarantining" of 
protesters in designated places distant from public events). 
335. /d. 
336. /d. 
337. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 
65--66 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (lst Cir. 
2004). 
338. Kuba v. A-1 Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down as 
unconstitutional the restrictions limiting protestors to small, distant free speech zones). 
339. /d. at 853. 
340. See Kalven, supra note 26, at 22. 
341. See, e.g., Steve Rubenstein & Kathleen Sullivan, S.F. Cops Grouse About What It's Like 
on the Front Lines, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 22, 2003, at W5, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2003/03/22/MN283872.DTL (describing the 
irritation that police felt during a riot). 
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The effects of spatial tactics on certain speakers and messages are 
magnified by the nature of the power they confer on the government. 
Structures like the Boston speech cage, the university gazebo, campaign 
"free speech" zones, and the 10-foot-by-20-foot speech zones outside the San 
Francisco Cow Palace all make it faster and easier for the state to observe 
speakers and to intervene when certain types of speech "go too far." More 
than this, as Foucault observed, tactical places are designed "to permit an 
internal, articulated and detailed control-to render visible those who are 
inside it"; the zones and other architectures "operate to transform individuals: 
to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the 
effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter 
them."342 Examined in this light, the presumption that such tactics are not 
designed to affect expressive content seems all the more implausible. 
Consider spatial tactics' effects from the perspective of the speaker 
ushered into a tactical place. From the speaker's point of view, spatial tactics 
make speech far more burdensome, and thus far less appealing. Spatial 
tactics, in other words, can have a substantial chilling effect on expression. 
That chill is magnified by the fact that spatial tactics operate directly on the 
body. This, among other things, is what makes place unique as a regulatory 
tool. Unlike most time, place, and manner regulations, spatial tactics are 
inherently coercive.343 If a speaker knows that stepping outside designated 
boundaries or zones can lead to punishment, she may be less inclined to step 
into them in the first place. If by entering a pen or barricade she forfeits her 
right to leave it, a protester may simply go home and skip the protest 
altogether. Or, as at the Democratic National Convention in Boston,344 the 
architecture may itself be so unappealing, or unsafe, that speakers simply 
refuse to enter. Note that these effects on participation are often obscured by 
spatial tactics' purported purpose, which is presented as accommodation of 
expression.345 The state claims to set aside space for expression by providing 
free speech zones.346 Spatial tactics thus can appear to facilitate speech 
while, in reality, suppressing and chilling it. 
342. FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 172 (emphasis added). 
343. This is not to say that time and manner cannot be used to suppress speech. See, e.g., Saia 
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) ("In this case a permit is denied because some persons were 
said to have found the sound annoying. In the next one a permit may be denied because some 
people find the ideas annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The 
power of censorship in this type of ordinance reveals its vice."). But it is less likely, and often far 
more obvious when this discrimination does occur. Time and manner regulations are not as visible 
to potential listeners as spatial ones. Nor do they operate in the same physically coercive way as 
zones, pens, and cages. The power to suppress expression by displacing it is both more subtle and 
substantial than the power to do so by resort to either time or manner. 
344. See Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat' I Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 
61, 65--66 (D. Mass. 2004), a.ff'd sub nom. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 
2004) (describing demonstration zones); see also supra notes 63, 80, 82 and accompanying text. 
345. See supra Part I. 
346. See supra Part l. 
2006] Speech and Spatial Tactics 637 
In sum, even if it is impossible to say that spatial tactics target particular 
points of view or subject matters, it is at least clear that tactical places are not 
entirely unrelated to the content of the expression they contain. Spatial 
tactics are politically and historically contingent strategies for dealing with 
particular types of disturbing and, from the state's perspective, threatening 
expression. The character of these places can chill and suppress expression 
on subjects like abortion, race, and the legitimacy of war. There is 
substantial reason to doubt the presumption that spatial tactics are wholly 
content-neutral. In these contexts, speech and spatiality are at least closely 
related. 
2. The "Message" ofTactical Place.-There is yet another perspective 
from which to view, and question, the presumption of content neutrality 
applied to tactical places: the perspective of those situated on the outside of 
these places. We have already examined the effect that tactical places have 
on speakers within. But recall that Part III's reconceptualization of place 
emphasized that place is dynamic, even vocal. Courts should thus also be 
interested in what these places "say" to listeners and viewers. If tactical 
places do in fact "speak" or communicate some message to potential 
audiences, if they actually say something about those they contain or their 
messages, then the presumption of content neutrality will be further 
undermined. 
As noted, in a general sense, where one is "placed" says something 
about relative status, knowledge, and power.347 Place thus communicates 
something about one's position in society. Things like permits, access to 
special events, first class accommodations, and gated communities speak of 
matters like wealth, influence, race, and ethnicity. 
Spatial tactics operate in a similar manner with regard to protesters. As 
Foucault observed with regard to asylums, prisons, and other institutions, 
spatial tactics are a means of "separating and branding" individuals. 348 The 
placement of persons tells a community, for example, who is sane, and who 
is not; who is dangerous, and who is not. 349 Cages, pens, buffers, and zones 
separate and brand speech and speakers considered offensive, disruptive, and 
dangerous. Through the edifice of place, the state communicates something 
about the nature and character of those inside to those who remain outside. 
In these tactical places reside the disgruntled minority, the societal 
"opposition." This is the tiny, agitated, displaced minority. 
In fact, tactical places may communicate something even more 
troubling than this. They may suggest that certain speakers be avoided 
347. SeesupraPartill. 
348. See FOUCAULT, supra note 267, at 231 (noting that imprisoning individuals is a means of 
"fixing them in space, classifYing them, ... [and] maintaining them in perfect visibility"). 
349. See id.; FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 280, at 68 (citing the 
practice of confining the mentally ill and then putting them on public display). 
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altogether. It is at least plausible to interpret many tactical places as a 
statement to the effect that spatial tactics are needed to segregate these 
speakers from others because they (and, by implication, their messages) are 
dangerous, offensive, or otherwise objectionable to society.350 This spatial 
branding directly implicates the First Amendment's neutrality principle. 
Viewed in this manner, tacticalplaces do more than separate speakers from 
potential listeners (willing and unwilling alike); they stigmatize the speech 
and the speakers they contain. 
Viewing tactical places as active and communicative, rather than inert 
and unrelated to expression, provides yet another basis for rejecting the 
presumption that place is a neutral divider. Adding this insight to the 
observations above regarding both the constructive process and expressive 
effects of tactical places rebuts the presumption that these uses of place are, 
like ordinary time, place, and manner restrictions, neutral with regard to 
speakers and expressive content. 
3. The "Correlation" of Spatiality and Speech Content.-Doctrinally, 
to say that speech and spatiality are closely related or that spatial tactics 
disparately impact certain speakers and messages does not provide sufficient 
basis for applying strict judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that 
any regulation "that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is 
deemed neutral," even where "it has an incidental effect on some speakers or 
messages but not others."351 So long as a regulation on the place of 
expression is ''justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech,"352 it does not receive strict scrutiny.353 The government will rarely, 
if ever, fail to meet this standard when it utilizes spatial tactics. Spatial 
tactics are typically said to serve interests in order and security. 
Nonetheless, as noted, the intersection of speech and spatiality sets 
spatial tactics apart from ordinary time, place, and manner regulations. Since 
spatial taetics neatly fit neither the content-neutral nor the content-based 
category, this Article suggests that courts consider spatial tactics "content-
correlated" regulations of expression. The "content-correlated" label is 
borrowed from the context of zoning of "adult" expression. 354 For some on 
350. See Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Cordoning protesters 
off in a free expression zone the size of a parking space, located over 200 feet from the entrance, far 
from encouraging interaction with them, is more likely to give the impression to passers by that 
these are people to be avoided."). 
351. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
352. Clark v. Cmty. for Cr~ative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis added). 
353. See id. at 312-13 (stating that "while regulations that tum on the content of the expression 
are subjected to a strict form of judicial review, regulations that are aimed at matters other than 
expression receive only a minimal level of scrutiny" (citation omitted)). 
354. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 459 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (addressing the city's use of a zoning ordinance to limit the number of adult businesses 
that could operate in a single building). 
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the Court,355 these zoning measures, which target establishments that display 
sexually explicit content, occupy "a kind of limbo between full-blown, 
content-based restrictions and regulations that apply without any reference to 
the substance of what is said."356 As in that context, calling a tactical place 
"content-correlated" would "not only describe it for what it is, but keep alert 
to a risk of content-based regulation that it poses."357 
The doctrinal and prescriptive implications of this label are explored 
below. To the extent they have elaborated on the approach, the Justices who 
subscribe to the "content-correlation" theory would subject the zoning of 
adult speech to greater scrutiny than is currently applied to ordinary time, 
place, and manner regulations.358 These Justices would part company with 
their colleagues by requiring, at least, an empirical demonstration of the 
"secondary effects" the government claims to rely upon to justify its 
zoning?59 Whether they might require even more than this, perhaps in other 
contexts where regulations are correlated with content, is uncertain. 
ln considering what sort of scrutiny to apply, it is worth pointing out 
that an upward adjustment would not be wholly novel insofar as spatial 
tactics are concerned. As noted in Part I, the Court has subjected injunctive 
abortion clinic "buffer zones" to a heightened standard of scrutiny.360 Justice 
Scalia sarcastically labeled this "intermediate-intermediate" scrutiny.361 But 
the Court's insight, which seems fundamentally sound, was that allowing 
judges to enjoin speech spatially gives rise to a special risk of content 
discrimination.362 Taking into account the process whereby tactical places 
are produced, however, there is no need to limit that insight to judges crafting 
injunctions. Legislatures, law enforcement officials, and other administrators 
can be just as intimately concerned with, and biased with respect to, certain 
speakers and expressive content.363 
B. Spatial Skepticism 
A time, place, and manner restriction must be content-neutral, serve 
important governmental interests, be narrowly tailored to serve those 
interests, and leave open ample alternative avenues or channels of 
355. The "content-correlated" concept originates from the first part of a dissenting opinion 
authored by Justice Souter, in which Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg joined. !d. at 453. 
356. !d. at 457. 
357. !d. 
358. !d. 
359. See id. (discussing the need for "empirical evidence" of secondary effects). 
360. See supra subpart l(B). 
361. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
362. See id. at 764 (majority opinion) ("Injunctions also carry greater risks of censorship and 
discriminatory application than do general ordinances."). 
363. See supra Part 1. 
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communication.364 The Court has significantly diminished the bite of this 
standard. As to neutrality, the Court has held that any regulation that is 
''justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech" will be 
deemed content-neutral.365 As noted, spatial regulations are nearly always 
justified with reference to order, safety, and other content-neutral interests 
that are considered important.366 The Court has also taken pains to point out 
that the tailoring of spatial regulations need not be the least restrictive or 
intrusive means available to the government.367 Finally, the adequacy of 
spatial alternatives has never been a serious component of the time, place, 
and manner analysis. Alternative places need only be theoretically, not 
realistically, available to the speaker to be considered "ample."368 And in 
terms of adequacy, places are treated as more or less fungible properties. 
Speakers are not entitled to the most efficacious place. Whatever the spatial 
regulation, it seems there is always an alternative space the speaker can 
utilize to make his point. 
This Article contends that courts confronting spatial tactics should be 
far more aware of the power of place to distort and suppress expression. The 
label that best captures this prescriptive proposal is spatial skepticism. 
Spatial skepticism does not entail that spatial tactics can never be utilized or 
that speakers have a right to speak anywhere they desire. Rather, the spatial 
skepticism concept seeks to limit the application and scope of spatial tactics 
to truly necessary contexts. It requires an inquiry into actual governmental 
purpose, skeptical review of the lines and boundaries of tactical places, and 
364. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("The State 
may [] enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, 
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication."). 
365. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis 
added) (stating that time, place, and manner restrictions "are valid provided that they are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information"); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989) (holding that any regulation "that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is 
deemed neutral"; this is so "even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others"). 
366. See, e.g., MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 
Chicago's parade ordinance "justified without reference to the content of the marchers' speech" 
because it required consideration of "whether the proposed activity will interfere with traffic," 
"whether the concentration of parade participants will prevent proper fire and police protection," 
and "the availability of police to protect participants from traffic hazards"). 
367. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 ("So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the government's interest ... the regulation will not be invalid simply 
because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-
speech-restrictive alternative."). 
368. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986) (disagreeing 
with the assertion that, because some of the suggested alternative locations for an adult theater were 
"occupied by existing businesses," such that there was purportedly no '"commercially viable"' 
space available, the alternative avenues of communication were inadequate). 
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serious examination of any purported alternative places where it is contended 
the expression may occur. 
I. Place, Post-9/11.-As mentioned in the Introduetion, one of the 
probable reasons for the rise of spatial tactics is the sense of foreboding that 
has gripped the nation since the events of September II, 2001. This does not 
account for all spatial tactics, of course. But it does account for some of the 
more disturbing tactical places, like those that are now fixtures of political 
protests in this country. Like so many other things, place has been affected 
by the threat and fear of public violence. 
There are general justifications, as noted above, for doubting spatial 
neutrality. Courts should not merely accept any governmental justification. 
They should demand some showing that the purpose is genuine, and that 
using place is necessary. In this regard, there is one purpose that merits 
special consideration. In the post-September 11 context, "security" from one 
thing or another has become perhaps the most prominent governmental 
rationale for spatial tactics.369 Courts will encounter this justification with 
increasing frequency. 
There are two reasons for courts to be skeptical of this particular 
justification. First, "security" is a far more malleable justification than those 
the state has historically used to justify spatial regulations. Ensuring that two 
parades do not collide, or that traffic continues to flow on a busy 
thoroughfare, are rather mundane considerations regarding basic order. 
Security is, by nature, a more complex, emotional, and politically charged 
justification than these sorts of things. Because courts are by nature less 
inclined to challenge this justifieation, "security" threatens a substantial 
expansion of governmental control over public places. Second, although 
spatial tactics do make us more secure (we are all "safer" insofar as those 
who seek to disrupt and agitate are peuned and caged), this security comes at 
a substantial price, namely a spatial regime premised upon "protection" from 
expression that disturbs, agitates, and offends. Courts should be quite 
sensitive to this tradeoff when assessing the security justification. 
Security is, of course, a substantial state interest. But there is a 
particular danger in our current social and political environment that courts 
will too readily defer to this governmental justification. No court, after all, 
wants to be responsible for violence (or worse) should there be a breach of 
security. As the Boston speech cage demonstrates, courts are too willing to 
369. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, l3 (lst Cir. 2004) (assessing the City 
of Boston's interest in "maintain[ing] security at the [2004 Democratic National] Convention," 
which led to the creation of a demonstration zone for protesters), aff'g Coal. to Protest the 
Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004); cf Bourgeois 
v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1321 (lith Cir. 2004) (relating the purported governmental interest behind 
a policy subjecting would-be protesters to magnetometer searches as the maintenance of public 
safety and security, an interest the city claimed was bolstered by the "post-September ll 
environment"). 
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defer to this rationale, even in the absence of any evidence to support it.370 
Protesters there were denied an opportunity to speak based upon reasoning 
that came dangerously close to a form of "guilt by association."371 The fact 
that past protesters elsewhere had committed violent acts was treated as 
reason enough to credit the government's assertion that these protesters 
would do likewise. 372 This sort of reasoning only contributes to the growing 
bias against and unease with dissident expression. Courts should make every 
effort to avoid it. 
This does not mean, however, that courts should second-guess every 
security determination made by law enforcement officials. It means only that 
where the presumption of neutrality no longer applies to spatial tactics, there 
is room to question governmental justifications for their use. There should 
be sufficient evidence of a threat to governmental interests to satisfy the 
court that "security" is not being used as a pretext to affect or suppress 
expression. This is a tricky empirical issue, since security relies in some 
cases on projections of danger. It may be necessary to consider some of the 
basis for the security justification in camera. In any event, the mere 
incantation of "security" should not be treated as sufficient cause for locking 
place down. 
Judicial skepticism should not, as noted, be limited to justifications 
based on security concerns. Spatial tactics represent a new generation of 
place restriction. They are purposefully being used to defuse social and 
political unrest. Given this trend, even ordinary justifications such as 
maintenance of "traffic flow" should be more skeptically reviewed where 
spatial tactics are used. Non-security-based justifications are generally 
susceptible to the sort of demonstration being urged here. The danger of 
pretextual resort to spatial tactics is sufficiently high that whatever the 
justification, the state should be required to provide some evidence that its 
interests and concerns are genuine. 
2. Tailoring Space.- Courts appear to be as reluctant to scrutinize the 
lines governments draw in constructing tactical places, their "tailoring," as 
they are to assess justifications for them. This reluctance can probably be 
traced in part to the historical deference given governmental zoning 
370. The First Circuit recognized the need for sensitivity to the security justification in 
reviewing the denial of protesters' request for injunctive relief during the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 13. The court stated, "Security is not a talisman that 
the government may invoke to justifY any burden on speech (no matter how oppressive). Thus, the 
question of narrow tailoring must be decided against the backdrop of the harms that a particular set 
of security measures are designed to forfend." !d. Yet the First Circuit ultimately approved the 
district court's decision, stating that "[t]he risks of violence and the dire consequences of that 
violence seem more probable and more substantial than they were before 9/ II. When judges are 
asked to assess these risks in the First Amendment balance, we must candidly acknowledge that 
they may weigh more than they once did." !d. at 19. 
3 71. See supra text accompanying notes 66-82. 
372. See supra text accompanying notes 66-82. 
2006] Speech and Spatial Tactics 643 
measures. 373 Contemporary Euclidian zoning, the sort that comprehensively 
partitions and regulates land uses, began to appear in the early twentieth 
century.374 As a spatial modality, zoning "institutes a centralized, command-
and-control style of land use regulation. It operates on the principle, 'a place 
for everything, and everything in its place. "'375 Spatial tactics are, of course, 
based upon a similar principle. To continue the analogy, spatial tactics might 
be viewed as regulations of "expressive uses." Thus, just as officials 
determine where certain business uses are appropriate, so too do they zone 
speech where this "use" is most appropriate. 
Despite the apparent similarity, the usual deference to governmental 
line-drawing is inappropriate where spatial tactics are used. The power of 
local officials to zone property for specific uses is well established. 376 From 
the beginning, three principles have been thought to generally validate spatial 
ordering through land use regulation. First, zoning schemes were 
comprehensive plans.377 Through place, they implemented a common 
community vision for cities and suburbs.378 Thus, rather than target specific 
uses, these plans were exercises of the police power in pursuit of the general 
welfare. 379 Second, zoning relied. substantially on experts to conceptualize 
and operationalize community plans. 380 The operative assumption was "that 
the most important problems in land-use planning were not political but 
scientific and technical."381 Architects, engineers, and other professionals 
were expected to play a major role in developing zoning plans.382 Arid these 
professionals were presumed to be neutral with regard to specific uses. 383 
Third, the increased specialization with regard to place contributed to a 
reduction in the scope of judicial review applied to zoning plans. 384 Experts, 
it was believed, should be flexibly permitted to manage changing 
landscapes. 385 Judges are in no position to second-guess the basis for or the 
373. See infra text accompanying notes 384--391. 
374. Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 739 (2004); see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (upholding a comprehensive local zoning plan). 
375. Claeys, supra note 374, at 739. 
376. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First 
Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REV. 767, 784--85 & nn.96-97 (1984) (stating that "[c]ommentators and 
courts have heralded special use zoning as a sound method of protecting the general character of a 
district through the grant of broad discretionary authority to local officials"). 
377. Claeys, supra note 374, at 740. 
378. See id. at 750 ("The Progressives loathed the absence of a comprehensive plan."). 
379. See id. at 750--51 (noting the "communitarian ideals" expressed through early zoning 
plans). 
380. See id. at 754 (noting that "the Progressives elevated experts and deprecated judges"). 
381. Id. 
382. !d. 
383. !d. at 754--55. 
384. See id. at 755 (noting that "as social progress and expert planners rationalized land use, 
they reduced the scope of judicial review"). 
385. Id. 
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specifics of zoning decisions.386 From the beginning, then, substantial 
judicial deference has been applied to ordinary zoning measures. 
These progressive principles--<:omprehensiveness, expertise, and 
judicial deference-may counsel against interference with the regulation of 
slaughterhouses and subdivisions. But courts should not apply them 
unthinkingly to justify upholding spatial restrictions on the exercise of 
fundamental expressive and associative rights. For one thing, spatial tactics 
are not comprehensive plans. They are, once again, targeted responses to 
social and political unrest. Nor, as has already been pointed out, are the 
"architects" of tactical places neutral engineers, scientists, land planners, or 
other land use experts. They are, by and large, officials with an inherent bias 
for order and control over expression.387 Hence it is no overstepping of 
judicial bounds to question the tailoring applied to "expressive uses." The 
rationale for judicial deference does not apply to spatial tactics. 
Courts do sometimes invalidate the spatial choices government officials 
make. But this typically occurs only where the speech zone is completely 
disproportionate to the government's stated needs. As noted in Part I, the 
2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles featured a 185-acre 
"secured zone" around the stadium where the convention was to take 
place.388 The official demonstration area, or "free speech zone," offered to 
protesters was located 260 yards from any participating delegate. 389 On its 
face, that tactical place is not a tailored response to any problem. Nor is a 
speech zone located 113 of a mile from the site of contention and the intended 
audiences. But the challenge is for judges to steel themselves to look more 
carefully at the lines drawn in even closer cases. Recognizing that these 
decisions are necessarily matters of degree, or rather feet, courts should 
nevertheless demand a persuasive showing that 50-, 75-, or 100-foot zones 
truly burden no more speech than is necessary under the circumstances. 
386. !d. at 756-57. 
387. The Court has permitted deferential zoning with regard to sexually explicit adult 
establishments. But it has done so on the implicit theory that the expression has little value. See 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (upholding Detroit zoning ordinances 
that geographically dispersed "adult" theaters by prohibiting any adult theater from being located 
within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area); id. 
("society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, 
magnitude" than the interest in protecting political debate or other expression); see also City of Los 
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429-43 (2002) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 
zoning restriction on multiple-use "adult" establishments); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture 
theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any "residential zone, single- or multiple-family 
dwelling, church, park, or school"). Whatever deference may be due localities when they regulate 
"low value" speech, this logic does not apply to the politically and socially significant expression 
affected by spatial tactics. 
388. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57. 
389. Serv. Employee lnt'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 
2000); see also Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a free 
speech policy that included designated zones). 
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They should ask whether hard barricades and pens are truly necessary. If 
these questions had been asked and answered honestly, it is difficult to 
imagine that the Boston speech cage would have survived meaningful 
judicial scrutiny. 
Courts may be more inclined to scrutinize the boundaries and features 
of tactical places if they understand how critical these things are to 
expressive rights. Among other adverse effects, spatial tactics undermine the 
historically venerable practice of intimate persuasion, practices like face-to-
face communication, and the distribution of literature. As institutional free 
speech policies proliferate, speakers will continue to be drawn into out-of-
the-way places that render face-to-face communication impossible. And if 
courts remain reluctant to engage questions of spatial tailoring, that is where 
such speakers will remain. 
There should be a presumption that any spatial tactic that prevents, or 
substantially burdens, attempts at intimate persuasion fails the tailoring 
standard. Of course, in situations like presidential appearances, that 
presumption can be overcome by real concerns for the president's safety. 
This does not mean presidents should receive a several-mile buffer, but 
personal contact is, and must necessarily be, limited in that context. But 
presidential access is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. In most 
circumstances, the need for separation between speakers and listeners is far 
less critical. Protesters outside auditoriums or conventions, in parks, and at 
health clinics should be given the benefit of the presumption that spatial 
tactics preventing intimate persuasion are unconstitutional. This may mean 
that greater security is required at these places. And if greater security is not 
sufficient to deal with a real and present danger, then spatial tactics may in 
the end prove to be necessary. But they should be a last, rather than a first, 
resort. 
3. Spatial Adequacy-One of the things courts are supposed to 
consider in assessing any spatial regulation is whether the regulation 
"leave[s] open adequate alternative channels of communication."390 Spatial 
skepticism would require that this inquiry, as well, be more rigorous in 
situations where spatial tactics are used. 
As current doctrine is interpreted and applied, it is the rare case that fails 
this particular element of the time, place, and manner test.391 This is so for 
the quite obvious reason that in most cases, a regulation of place will not 
wholly prevent a speaker from communicating elsewhere. If a speaker 
cannot post signs here, for example, then he may still hand out literature over 
there. The doctrine of place generally presumes that one place is as good as 
390. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,76 (1981). 
391. There are some examples, however. For a recent case finding a lack of adequate 
alternative channels of communication in the context of a political protest, see Blair v. City of 
Evansville, 361 F. Supp. 2d 846, 859 (S.D. Ind. 2005). 
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the next. And speakers are not in any event entitled to the best place, but 
only one that is "adequate." Consequently, courts spend little, if any, time 
contemplating the relative expressive merits of alternative places. 
As the avenues of communication have multiplied, it has only become 
easier to gloss over this part of the analysis. Recall the First Circuit's 
conclusion that the protesters subject to the speech cage in Boston could have 
communicated their messages through the media assembled to cover the 
national convention.392 This is a dubious supposition to begin with; the 
media typically cover the act of protest itself, which the cage prevented. But 
the deeper problem with this analysis is that the court failed to appreciate the 
significance of the place of expression to the protesters' intended message. 
Being there, at that place, was in some sense critical to the protesters. 
Massing with others to confront those who were attending the event was an 
inextricable part of the message they sought to convey. The principles of 
spatial primacy and dynamism, discussed in Part III, emphasize that the place 
of expression is often critically associated with the expressive message.393 
As the First Circuit's analysis indicates, courts generally fail to take such 
insights into account when examining place. 
Aside from making this broad connection between speech and spatiality, 
there are several specific things that courts should consider in deciding 
whether ample or adequate space remains available to speakers. How 
efficient is the alternative place relative to the place speakers have been 
denied? How far is it from where the speakers originally wanted to be? 
Does it entail additional costs, either in terms of time or money? How are its 
specific characteristics or qualities likely to affect the planned social and 
expressive activity? To what extent will the alternative space force speakers 
to alter their message or their chosen method of communication? This is by 
no means an exhaustive list. At a minimum, however, an adequacy 
determination should not be made without considering the expense, location, 
qualities, and expressive effects of the suggested alternative place or places. 
C. Space As an "Index of Freedom" 
Questioning governmental purposes, ensuring minimal impact on 
expressive and associative rights, and assessing spatial adequacy may, to 
some, seem hardly worth the effort in this context. After all, these things are 
being done merely to preserve discourse in public places that no longer seem 
critical to expression. This is particularly so in light of the various 
communication technologies modern speakers and listeners have at their 
disposal. What difference does it make, some might say, that a protester 
392. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004), aff'g Coal. to Protest 
the Democratic Nat'! Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F.Supp 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004). 
393. See discussion supra sections lii(A)(2), III(A)(4). 
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cannot speak in the public park when she can blog or otherwise electronically 
communicate her view to millions? This sort of reasoning underlies the First 
Circuit's rationale urging the convention protesters to resort to media 
coverage as an alternative to demonstrating in person.394 Of course, the 
Internet and other technologies have become critical media for the cheap, 
rapid, and widespread exchange of ideas. But that does not mean that they 
have supplanted real, physical places. Protection of access to the streets, 
sidewalks, and parks remains critical to expressive and associative freedoms. 
Despite advances in expressive technologies,. there are three broad 
reasons for undertaking the suggested skeptical examination of spatial 
tactics. The first relates to First Amendment theory broadly. The shrinking 
and segmenting of public space that is open to expression undermines many 
of the foundational premises of freedom of expression. Spatial techniques 
produce a much smaller "marketplace of ideas," less space for self-
government, and less room for individual self-fulfillment.395 We cannot self-
govern from inside cages, pens, and finely wrought zones. Public officials 
who travel in bubbles and appear in dissent-free zones are increasingly 
isol~ted and insulated from the public and its concerns. Moreover, place is a 
critical component of the "safety valve" for our society's most offensive and 
divisive expression.396 But face-to-face confrontation is no longer viewed as 
simply uncomfortable; it is being treated as presumptively insidious and 
dangerous. 
These theoretical concerns have now confronted a stark modem reality. 
Public space is a rapidly diminishing resource. That is particularly true with 
respect to public space that is open to expressive activity, the so-called public 
forums. Main street has been replaced by the super-mall, where the First 
Amendment generally does not apply.397 We spend an increasing amount of 
time today in places like airport terminals and subway systems, what some 
scholars call "non-places."398 These places are not designed for social 
interaction or expression. In these places, then, opportunities for significant 
public debate and expression are few, and dwindling. 
394. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 14 (noting that "[m]essages expressed beyond the first-
hand sight and sound of the delegates nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through 
television, radio, the press, the internet, and other outlets"; thus, "viable alternative means existed to 
enable protesters to communicate their messages to the delegates"). 
395. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND lTS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
15-16, 24-27 (1948) (advancing self-governance theory); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech 
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989) (discussing "marketplace" and other free speech 
justifications). 
396. See THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (arguing 
that free speech leads to stability). 
397. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520--21 (1976) (holding that labor picketers had no 
right to demonstrate at a shopping center); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972) 
(holding that Vietnam War protestors had no right to distribute handbills in a shopping center). 
398. See supra notes 245-246 and accompanying text. 
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lf the requisite breathing space for expression is to be preserved, our 
streets, sidewalks, and parks must remain free, open, and speech-facilitative. 
What Harry Kalven, Jr. said in his seminal article on the public forum 
remains true today: 
[I]n an open democrac[y] ... the streets, the parks, and other public 
places are an important facility for public discussion and political 
process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can 
commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities 
are made available is an index offreedom.399 
Spatial tactics, of course, preclude speakers from "commandeering" any 
public places, including the streets and parks. lf the openness of public 
places to expressive activity is in fact an "index of freedom," then we appear 
as a society not to value public discourse much at all. 
Second, on a more practical but no less important level, cyberspace, for 
all of its innovations, simply cannot replace or imitate live protests and other 
forms of expression. Anyone who has ever participated in an "online 
protest" already knows this. As recent street protests around the world attest, 
being there, and with others, are critical aspects of public dissent.400 lf the 
Internet is an effective substitute for this space, then why do we still see 
people massing in public streets and squares where it and like technologies 
are readily available? Part of the answer has to be that there is powerful 
symbolism in gathering with others in public spaces. This does not depend 
upon changing minds or any other notion of expressive effectiveness. The 
event itself is cathartic, expressive, evocative, emotive, and meaningful to 
those who participate. Speech on the Web shares few, if any, of these critical 
characteristics. 
Nor are cyberplaces more generally adequate substitutes for public 
places like streets and parks. The history of civil protest is, in substantial 
part, a history of places. The Mall, the Lincoln Memorial, Central Park, 
Selma; these are integral aspects of our social and political heritage. 
Cyberplaces do not retain or conjure lessons, meanings, or memories in a like 
manner. Only real places are dynamic and expressive in this sense. ln sum, 
as important as they are to expressive freedom, cyberplaces and other 
metaphysieal places cannot alone ensure that "debate on public issues [will] 
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.'-AOI 
399. Kalven, supra note 26, at 11-12 (emphasis added). 
400. See, e.g., Blair v. City of Evansville, 361 F. Supp. 2d 846, 856 (S.D. Ind. 2005) 
(discussing the defendant's First Amendment argument regarding his right to be close enough to the 
Vice President and the Vice President's supporters that they could hear his protests); Thomas Fuller, 
Day of French Protests Draws Droves Nationwide, INT'L HERALD TR.l.B., Oct. 5, 2005, at 3 
(reporting that "[h]undreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets across France on 
Tuesday in 150 anti-government marches to protest privatization, stagnant wages and a Jaw that 
makes it easier to Jay off employees at small companies"). 
401. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964) (emphasis added). 
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Third, and finally, despite occasional suggestions to the contrary, the 
public square lives. Harry Kalven, Jr. was writing at the height of the Civil 
Rights movement, with special sensitivity to that particular movement's need 
for public room or space.402 Perhaps we cannot return to an era in which 
citizens can "commandeer" the streets. There is real danger in that sort of 
freedom, and there are certainly those who might abuse it. But we should be 
careful not to tum the possibility of violence and confrontation, or the 
existence of alternative modes of communication, into an excuse for 
permitting the government to manipulate public places. Again evidence from 
around the world demonstrates that real places like streets, parks, and public 
squares still matter to social and political movements. The streets have been 
central to recent protests in Colombia,403 China,404 and Kyrgistan to name 
only a few countries.405 At home, the protests of the Iraq War,406 the national 
political conventions,407 .and the presidential inauguration408 all demonstrate 
that these public places are still critical to social movements and political 
culture. 
If the public cannot commandeer the public square, then at least spatial 
tactics should be limited and constrained to permit the effective use of these 
places. Demonstrations depend for their effectiveness, including their media 
coverage, upon reasonable proximity to intended audiences.409 As past 
402. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
403. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, By Millions, Colombians Take to Streets Against War, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 1999, at 15 (reporting that "at least five million Colombians marched late last month in 
more than 700 cities and towns to urge an end to [civil conflict] and related human rights abuses"). 
404. See, e.g., John Pomfret, A Buildup of Irritation in Relations, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at 
Al (noting that following the U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Yugoslavia, hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese took to the streets to demonstrate against the United States). 
405. See, e.g., Christopher Pala, Protests Force Leader to Flee in Kyrgyzstan, N.Y. nMEs, 
Mar. 25, 2005, at Al (stating that "[p]rotesters alleging corruption, repression and electoral fraud 
forced the longtime president of this central Asian country to flee his palace"). 
406. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, In D.C., a Diverse Mix Rouses War Protest, WASH. POST, 
Oct; 26, 2003, at A8 (describing anti-lraq war protests that took place in more than two dozen U.S. 
cities on the previous day, including one in Washington, D.C. that proceeded "along a route that 
ringed the Washington Monument, the White House and the Justice Department"). 
407. See, e.g., Serv. Employee lnt'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968, 
975 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that protestors of the 2000 Democratic National Convention were 
entitled to use the surrounding streets and sidewalks for public demonstrations, marches, and 
speeches). 
408. See Paulson, supra note 36 (noting that protesters were issued permits to demonstrate only 
in designated areas along the parade route during the 2000 presidential inauguration). 
409. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating 
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests-section II, 29 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1163, 1206 ri.l09 (1996) ("Proximity allows the speaker to establish both aural 
and visual contact with the listener in a personal manner. This facilitates and amplifies the 
transmission of the message being conveyed by erihancing the dramatic impact of expression and 
demonstrating the intensity of the speaker's beliefs."); Mark S. Nadel, Customized News Services 
and Extremist Enclaves in Republic.com, 54 STAN. L. REv. 831, 871 (2002) (book review) ("Today, 
a public forum's role as a mass media channel for speakers is primarily as a location for staging 
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demonstrations have taught, confrontation, disruption, and a degree of 
spontaneity are critical aspects of these fundamental collective rights.410 It is 
impossible to imagine the 1960s Civil Rights movement or the era of 
Vietnam protests-two periods indelibly etched on our collective national 
psyche-occurring from within pens, cages, bubbles, and "free speech 
zones." Unrestrained protests can teach volumes; demonstrations in tightly 
constructed cages, by contrast, convey only how little value we currently 
place on protest and dissent. 
In our own time, spatial tactics are making it impossible for history to 
repeat itself. A demonstration on the West Side Highway, for example, is 
simply not an adequate substitute for one that abuts the site of the Republican 
National Convention.411 A cage that makes it impossible for protesters to be 
seen or heard, or for their presence to be felt, does not provide a 
constitutionally adequate place for expression. Barricades create docile 
bodies, to be sure, but at the expense of the spontaneity and creativity that 
make protest an effective mode of expression. As one commentator put it: 
"The 'Huddle on Washington' just doesn't have the same ring to it.'"' 12 A 
social or political movement must, after all, have some freedom to move. 
Our expressive topography is increasingly inhospitable to the very 
speech that merits the greatest protection, namely speech on matters of public 
concern, including political speech. The speech that takes place in the public 
streets and parks is very often uncomfortable for many to witness. But it is a 
truism that the measure of a society's freedom is its ability and willingness to 
embrace unpopular behaviors and attitudes. By that measure, spatial tactics 
speak volumes regarding this society's current commitment to freedom of 
expression. To return to Kalven once more: 
Among the many hallmarks of an open society, surely one must be 
that not every group of people on the streets is a mob, and another that 
its streets time out of mind have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.413 
presentations, including protests and rallies, intended to reach mass audiences via conventional 
mass media."). 
410. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (asserting that "timing is of the essence" with regard to political protest because "when 
an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at 
all"); Cheh, supra note 35, at 62 (offering examples in support of the assertion that 
"[c]onfrontational and troublesome protests and demonstrations, particularly those held in 
Washington D.C., have had a direct effect on the great public questions of the day"). 
411. For an account of this real-life forum substitution, see Diane Cardwell, Protesters Accept a 
Stage Distant from G.O.P. Ears, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at B3, which reported that a large rally 
that protesters had originally hoped to hold in Central Park had been moved to a site on the West 
Side Highway. 
412. Paulson, supra note 36. 
413. Kalven, supra note 26, at 32 (quotations omitted). 
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We . would do well to keep such sentiments in mind in the current 
century, and in centuries to come. 
V. Conclusion 
Streets, sidewalks, and other public spaces are increasingly subject to 
spatial tactics, the utilization of space for social and political control. As 
Harry Kalven, Jr. wrote forty years ago: "[T]he generosity and empathy with 
which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom.'>4 14 That 
index is presently at a low point; speakers are now routinely confined to 
cages, zones, pens, and other spatial architectures. This Article has argued 
that place in general, and spatial tactics in particular, are not as neutral as 
current speech doctrine indicates. To decide where expression takes place is 
to choose a distribution of power and knowledge, to make normative 
judgments about what speech should be seen and heard and what speech 
should be segregated and avoided. Tactical places separate and brand 
speakers; communicate to the public that dissent, and dissenters, are 
dangerous and are to be avoided; facilitate avoidance of unpopular or 
offensive speech; inhibit movement and associative expression; and allow for 
tight surveillance of unpopular speech and speakers. 
This Article argues that we must finally abandon the conception of 
place-as-res. lt proposes that courts adopt a reconceptualization of place as 
distinctly expressive-as variable, primary to speech, constructed, and 
dynamic. This is a critical first step to reconnecting speech and spatiality. 
Based upon this reconceptualization, this Article advocates what it calls 
spatial skepticism, essentially a closer review of spatial tactics and tactical 
places. Armed with the knowledge of what place actually is, courts should 
no longer blindly accept a state's proffered justifications for resorting to 
spatial tactics. Nor should courts simply defer to the lines, boundaries, and 
architectural features the state imposes, or accept unquestioningly the 
"adequacy" of the places the state offers as alternative locations for 
expressive activity. The state, in other words, should henceforth be forced to 
justify the expressive topography it is mapping. 
414. !d. at 12. 
